From the Social Contract to the Washington Agreement: How has the Lebanese Authority lost its legitimacy

Confronting the resistance has become the priority of the Lebanese state, while the Israeli occupation has remained, in a transformation that was considered a coup against the function of the state and the social contract

Radwan Mortada at The Cradle Arabic

Translated with in-browser translation.

The legitimacy of the state is not a permanent status granted by elections, international recognition or the monopoly of weapons. In modern political thought, power does not gain legitimacy from its existence, but from the function for which it was created. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, one of the most prominent theorists of the modern state, summarized this idea when he considered that people gave up part of their freedom of the state in exchange for security. If you cannot protect them, the justification on which it was based falls.

The English philosopher John Locke, one of the fathers of political liberalism, went further, arguing that power loses its legitimacy when it overturns the natural rights of citizens or arbitrarily governs, and then the people have the right to resist it. The Swiss-French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau adds that legitimacy only represents the general will; if power is transformed into an instrument of a political class or becomes subject to external will, it has broken the social contract that created it.

These ideas are not an abstract philosophical debate, but a standard by which the performance of any authority can be evaluated. A State that is unable to protect its borders, does not prevent the killing of its citizens, accepts the occupation of part of its territory, and then directs its full power towards part of its people, has changed its basic function. It no longer protects society, but manages the crisis at its expense. This is the question that arises today in Lebanon.

From Confronting Occupation to Pursuing Resistance

Since the beginning of 2025, the Lebanese authority has seemed to have redefined the concept of sovereignty. The Israeli occupation is no longer the first threat to be confronted, but rather the weapon raised by the resistance. With the cabinet session on March 2nd, this shift from political discourse to official decision shifted. The legitimate military government has confined the state and treated Hezbollah’s military wing as an illegal force whose existence should be ended.

The Lebanese may disagree about Hezbollah’s weapons, but what cannot be ignored is that this decision came as Israel was still occupying Lebanese territory, continuing its military operations inside Lebanon, and killing civilians almost daily. Here is the paradox: the state has chosen to begin to regain its sovereignty from within, not from the occupation.

After the March 2nd session, the decision did not remain ink on paper. A campaign of raids, arrests and security measures targeting individuals linked to the resistance began, while the resistance fighter fighting on the border found itself between the hammer of Israel and the anvil of the Lebanese authority. At a time when the Government was raising the slogan of the monopoly of arms, Israeli arms remained operating freely within Lebanese territory, without the State being able to enforce the withdrawal or cessation of aggression, or even to extract clear sovereign guarantees.

At the same time, the PA has rearranged its institutions in line with this political option. The role of the Presidency of the Republic in the management of the security and military files has expanded, and its direct presence in the direction of the organs has increased. Then came the appointment of the discriminatory prosecutor Ahmed Rami Al-Haj at the head of the Discriminatory Public Prosecution, to complete the transition of the decision from the political level to the judicial level.

The problem here is not so much about people as it is in the function of institutions. In any State, the judiciary is the guarantor of the independence of the law, not a tool for implementing political options. When judicial appointments coincide with a security track targeting a Lebanese party, while Israeli crimes remain outside any effective prosecution, the question becomes legitimate: is the judiciary still fulfilling its natural role, or has it become part of the redefinition of the function of the state itself?

At this very moment, the social contract begins to crack. The authority is no longer measured by its security apparatus, but by what it chooses to use these devices for. When its priority becomes the pursuit of part of society, while the occupation remains, the crisis is no longer a political crisis, but a legitimate one.

Five rounds. The cease-fire came from somewhere else

This internal transformation was not isolated from the external trajectory, but proceeded in parallel with it. From April to June 2016, the Lebanese Authority participated in five rounds of negotiations in Washington, which were presented to the public as the only way to restore sovereignty and end the Israeli occupation. However, the criterion for the success of any negotiation is its outcome, not the number of its meetings, and the result was clear: those meetings did not succeed in imposing a ceasefire, nor in wresting an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.

In return, the ceasefire came from a completely different path. Iran has linked its continued negotiations with the United States to the cessation of military operations in Lebanon, and has threatened to thwart the path of understanding and take escalatory steps if the war continues. Under this pressure, US President Donald Trump was forced to pressure Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the ceasefire, in order to preserve the interests of the United States and the path of negotiation with Tehran.

Here is the political paradox. The ceasefire, which five Lebanese negotiating rounds have been unable to achieve, is the result of regional balances that have no direct relationship with the Lebanese negotiator. This alone raises the question of the feasibility of the path chosen by the Lebanese Authority, and the reality of the priorities that governed it.

More importantly, the ceasefire, according to Iran’s stated vision, was only the first stage of a broader path. Tehran announced that the agreement is based on two phases: the first begins with the cessation of military operations, allowing the signing of the draft agreement with the United States, and the second requires the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon before the final signing of the nuclear agreement.

So far, Trump has not gotten the deal he is seeking with Iran, meaning the key leverage has not yet been used. If the nuclear deal is conditional on Israel’s withdrawal, Washington is likely to return to lobbying the Netanyahu government, just as it did when it forced it to cease fire. Any withdrawal from the south would be a severe political blow to Netanyahu, because he would emerge internally as a prime minister who had to retreat under U.S. and regional pressure.

On the other hand, the path chosen by President Joseph Aoun does not seem to have achieved any tangible result so far. If the state could not even impose on Israel even allowing the repair of a water crop inside Lebanese territory, it is difficult to imagine that the same approach would lead to a complete withdrawal. Any international understanding of this kind, regardless of its political size, remains ineffective for its constitutional value unless it is approved in accordance with the mechanisms provided for in the Lebanese Constitution, foremost of which is the approval by the House of Representatives of treaties affecting the sovereignty and rights of the State.

Sovereignty or reordering priorities?

But the most dangerous was not the failure of the negotiations, but the nature of the agreement that came out of Washington. The tripartite framework statement revealed that the priority is no longer to end the occupation, but to reshape the security reality inside Lebanon. This explains the clear Israeli welcome of the agreement.

Benjamin Netanyahu called the deal an “excretion for Israel” and said the Lebanese government had failed Iran’s bid to force Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. More seriously, he said, Lebanon and the United States have recognized Israel’s right to maintain a security zone inside Lebanese territory as long as Tel Aviv considers it necessary for its security.

Regardless of the debate over the interpretation of the texts, the mere presentation of the agreement in this way within Israel is very political. The agreement, which was supposed to be a gateway to the restoration of sovereignty, turned in the Israeli discourse into a stabilization of a new security reality that allows the continuation of the occupation under the name of “security zone.” This alone is enough to understand why the Israeli leadership is celebrating it.

Here, the danger of the Washington agreement begins. The problem lies not only in its technical provisions, but also in the political philosophy on which it is based. It does not stem from the fact that the Israeli occupation is the first problem to be ended, but rather from the fact that the weapon of resistance is the most urgent issue. In this sense, the center of gravity moves from confronting the occupation to reshaping the internal balance, even if the occupation persists.

This is clearly illustrated in Article IV of the agreement, in which the Lebanese government affirms its commitment to “rebuilding the state monopoly on the use of force and achieving complete and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups” before requesting support from “international partners, especially Arabs, under the leadership of the United States to achieve this outcome.”

The Lebanese may disagree on the interpretation of this text, but what cannot be ignored is that it makes the Israeli security demand part of the Lebanese state’s work program, and puts its implementation under the leadership of the United States. More dangerously, it opens the door to the involvement of external parties in the management of an internal sovereign file, at a time when the agreement does not include a corresponding commitment to end the Israeli occupation or set a clear timetable for withdrawal.

Hence the Israeli welcome of the agreement is understandable. Netanyahu did not have to hide his satisfaction, but openly declared that the agreement with the Lebanese government thwarted Iran’s effort to impose Israel’s withdrawal from the south, and went further when he thanked the Lebanese government and the Lebanese people for what he described as “courage.” This is not just political propaganda, but an Israeli reading of an agreement that it considers a strategic gain.

Rubio, Vance. Who is shaping Washington’s policy toward Lebanon?

The agreement between Lebanon and Israel cannot be understood from the point of view of bilateral negotiation, but should be placed within the reshaping of the balance of power within Washington itself. The American policy towards Lebanon is no longer formulated exclusively within official institutions, but is also affected by the competition between the centers of influence within the administration and the Republican Party, and by the pressure exerted by the pro-Israel lobby groups, specifically the Zionist lobby and the Lebanese Christian extremist lobby.

In this context, many see the growing influence of the current closest to Israel within the US administration has boosted the chances of pushing for an agreement that prioritizes Israeli interests in Lebanon. The conflict within the Republican camp between currents with different approaches to foreign policy was also an influential factor in charting this path, as it was reflected in the mechanism of dealing with the Lebanese file.

This influence was not limited to Washington, but also found its extension inside Lebanon, through a network of political, financial and media figures belonging to the Christian right or allied with it, which in recent years has worked to build channels of communication and influence with US decision-making circles.

In particular, banker Anton Sehnaoui, who played a key role in the appointment of Lebanon’s ambassador to Washington, Nada Hamadeh, and the governor of the Central Bank, Karim Said, as well as his great influence in the Lebanese Republican Palace.

This intersection between external pressures and local allies has provided a more receptive political environment for the U.S.-Israeli-conditioned settlement option. Hence, the agreement does not seem to be just the result of balances on the ground, but also the result of a cross-border political alliance linking the pressure centers in Washington to the networks of influence inside Lebanon, which sought to reformulate the priorities of the Lebanese state in line with the American and Israeli vision of the region.

In Washington, this path cannot be separated from the silent conflict within the American right itself, specifically between two lines represented by Marco Rubio and J. D. Vance. The first expresses the traditional Republican trend that is more attached to Israel and its pro-Israel pressure networks, while the latter represents a relatively isolationist trend, more cautious towards American involvement in the Middle East.

From this angle, the support of the pro-Israel lobby for Rubio in the face of Vance becomes more than an electoral or partisan detail. It is an indication of who these networks want to enable within the U.S. decision, especially in files that directly affect Israel.

As far as Rubio’s line within the administration is advanced, the approach that looks at Lebanon from the point of view of Israeli security first is strengthened, not from the point of view of Lebanese sovereignty or cessation of aggression. Therefore, the agreement between Lebanon and Israel can be read as part of the outcome of this balance within Washington: a relative victory of the current closest to Israel over the more conservative current towards external engagement. This explains why the agreement was not just a border or security understanding, but a political station that reflected the weight of the pro-Israel lobby within the Republican Party and the US administration.

In this context, and with the expansion of the circle of competition within the decision-making centers, additional data have emerged on the nature of the conflict between the wings of influence in Washington. A senior Gulf security source told The Crydle that J.D. Vance was deeply angry with Marco Rubio after learning that the latter was planning to visit the Gulf states without any prior consultation. Vice President Vance suspected that Rubio was working hard to undermine his achievement, through behind-the-scenes arrangements with Jared Kushner, and possibly also with Steve Whitkov.

Vance’s suspicions are growing that there is a coalition of Rubio, Kushner and Lindsey Graham, who are working to marginalize him and push him into the corner, in an attempt to outdo him politically in preparation for the upcoming presidential election.

In contrast, Rubio is still unsure whether he himself is being exploited by his boss, or if the president is actually the one under the influence of his son-in-law Kushner and Rubio.

Was the priority of the authority to end the war?

This scene reinforces the impression that the Lebanese authority did not see the continuation of the war as a political burden, but rather an opportunity to redraw the internal balance. It is difficult to explain the PA’s enthusiasm for implementing the resistance clauses, in exchange for the complete inability to extract any clear Israeli commitment to withdraw or even to stop daily attacks.

That’s why it’s legitimate to question whether the five rounds of power in Washington actually sought a ceasefire, or whether they were more focused on the post-war period than on ending it. The results suggest that the authority’s priority was not to end the aggression, but to invest it to rearrange the internal landscape.

If this estimate is correct, the Washington agreement is not just a security understanding, but a milestone in redefining the function of the Lebanese state. Since March 2nd, power has gradually shifted from considering Israel as the number one enemy to the most urgent problem of resistance. With the Washington agreement, this transformation was completed politically, so that the occupation became an open negotiating file, while the confrontation with the resistance turned into a formal commitment to the state.

Sovereignty between inside and outside

Here the most dangerous paradox emerges. The PA raised the slogan of restoring sovereignty, but it exercised its sovereignty only on the Lebanese side. It used the security and judicial agencies at home, but it was unable to impose it on the state it occupies. It called for the disarmament of the Lebanese, but did not receive an Israeli withdrawal, a permanent cessation of aggression, or even a guarantee that would prevent Israel from resuming its military operations at will.

Indeed, as it stands, the agreement goes further. According to his critics, he not only rearranges security priorities, but also constrains the ability of the Lebanese state to use the legal and political tools at its disposal against Israel. If the government commits to stop “negative actions” in international forums, it raises a legitimate question about the future of legal prosecutions related to Israeli war crimes and violations, and about Lebanon’s ability to continue using international platforms to hold Israel accountable.

Thus, the debate does not become limited to military sovereignty, but also to legal and political sovereignty. A State that renounces its right to prosecute those who occupy its territory or commit crimes against its citizens has not only waived a negotiating card, but also one of the most important instruments of justice it possesses.

From the Social Contract to the Crisis of Legitimacy

Therefore, the danger of the Washington agreement is not that it is just a security understanding or a passing political document, but that it reflects a profound shift in the concept and function of the Lebanese state. The state, which is supposed to be there to protect the land and defend society, now considers that its priority is to re-monopoly force at home, even if the occupation remains, and even if the killing of the Lebanese continues and the country’s sovereignty continues to be violated on a daily basis.

Here, the question is no longer about Hezbollah alone, nor about Joseph Aoun alone, not even the agreement itself. The real question is: What is left of the social contract on which the Lebanese state was founded?

The social contract does not impose on the citizen to obey the authority for itself, but first imposes on the authority to carry out the function for which it was created. If it became incapable of protecting the borders, unable to prevent the occupation of its territory, tolerant of the continued killing of its citizens, and then used all its security and judicial tools against part of its society, it had violated the essence of the contract that gave it the legitimacy of governance.

This is why, in the eyes of its critics, the Washington agreement is more dangerous than the May 17 agreement. The latter was a clear political agreement with Israel, which fell quickly under the pressure of the Lebanese interior and its popular rejection. The new agreement seeks to reproduce the same results, but under different headings: the restoration of sovereignty, the monopoly of arms, security reform, and international support. He does not ask Lebanon to recognize Israel, but he is rearranging the country’s priorities to make ending the resistance more urgent than ending the occupation.

Hence, it is understandable why Israel received the agreement with satisfaction. It has not only obtained a new security mechanism, but also a shift in the function of the Lebanese Authority itself. Instead of being the central issue, the official priority has been to deal with Lebanese weapons. Instead of being preoccupied with the imposition of the Israeli withdrawal, the state has been busy rebuilding its security and judicial institutions to implement an internal program that is in line with the terms of the agreement.

In this context, Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements do not seem to be mere media consumption. When he says that the agreement with the Lebanese government has failed the Iranian effort to force Israel to withdraw, and that Lebanon and the United States have recognized Israel’s right to maintain a security zone inside Lebanon, it offers a political reading of what it considers one of Israel’s most important achievements since the end of the war.

This reading may be disputed, but the mere ability of the Prime Minister of the occupation government to present the agreement in this way, without a clear and decisive Lebanese denial of its content, reflects the magnitude of the crisis generated by the agreement internally.

It is not limited to the political dimension. Even constitutionally, neither the President of the Republic nor the executive authority alone has the power to conclude agreements that permanently affect the sovereignty of the State without going through the constitutional mechanisms, foremost among which is the Chamber of Deputies, to which the resolution of treaties that entails obligations on the State or affect its rights and sovereignty.

Perhaps that is also why the road to any final settlement remains unpaved. The U.S.-Iranian negotiations have not reached their conclusions, and the Israeli withdrawal, if it happens, will remain linked to complex regional balances and not to the Lebanese track alone. This means that the agreement celebrated by the authority may not be the last stop, but just a stage in a path whose results have not yet been decided.

However, regardless of the outcome of the regional negotiations, the most serious impact remains internally. From the March 2nd session, through the redirection of the security services, the activation of the judicial process, and to the Washington agreement, the Lebanese authority went in one direction: redefining the enemy, redefining sovereignty, and redefining the function of the state.

Here, political philosophy returns to meet the Lebanese reality.

Hobbes did not say that the state loses its legitimacy when it loses a war. Locke did not say she was falling because she was unable to fight. Rousseau did not say that the existence of institutions alone was sufficient for the continuation of power. What they agreed on, each in his own way, is that the state loses its legitimacy when it abandons the purpose for which it was created.

The first goal of any state is not to manage the occupation, but to end it. It is not the pursuit of those who resist it, but the protection of its society and its sovereignty.

When the occupation becomes adaptable, and the killing of citizens becomes a reality that can be lived with, and the tools of the state turn into a means of pressuring part of its people more than a means to defend it, the crisis is no longer a crisis of government, president or political agreement, but a crisis of the legitimacy of the state itself.

At this point, the question that began with this article becomes more urgent than ever: is the Lebanese authority still exercising the function for which the people have given its legitimacy, or has it become an authority that legitimizes the occupation to protect itself, even if the price is to redefine sovereignty in accordance with the balance of power, not with the rights of the state and its basic functions? Especially after the President of the Lebanese Republic, Joseph Aoun, put his hand in the hands of the criminal Benjamin Netanyahu, who is responsible for one of the most heinous massacres and genocides in modern times. The agreement was decided with a serial killer who kills Lebanese and Palestinians daily, while the countries of the world tend to boycott Israel and isolate it because of the crimes it committed against more than a hundred thousand civilians in Palestine and Lebanon. The Lebanese president chose to take sides with the occupation to reveal his true face, justifying his survival on the land of Lebanon and giving him political cover, ignoring that Israel is still occupying Lebanese territory, and continues to kill the Lebanese and attack the sovereignty of the country