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Nel Bonilla : The El Salvador–Haiti Deployment as Doctrinal Burden-Shifting

Note : if you follow Brian Berletic you will see that he talks about this very same ‘burden sharing’ or ‘burden shifting’ and that it is a part of continuity of agenda.  It is doctrinal, as Nel B describes in her very good essay.  We have to update on what is happening in Latin America and this is roughly scheduled for the next week or so.


On the recent broadcast of América Insumisa on Contralínea 

) examining El Salvador’s military intervention in Haiti, Aníbal García (

), Dr. Marcela Román (

), and Dr. Pablo Rojas (

It hit the structural nail on the head regarding what is unfolding across the Greater Caribbean today: they defined it as geopolitical and military outsourcing (terciarización geopolítica y bélica).

In the lexicon of the US security apparatus, this is called burden-shifting and represents an almost official policy of proxy warfare, according to the US Army War College’s own report (Academic Year 2026–27 Annual Estimate of the Strategic Security Environment).

This is not a new strategy; the historical moment has arrived in which it can finally be executed. My research on NATO demonstrates that the empire led by US elites has been dreaming of and designing the transfer of the conventional military burden—the soldiers and “simple” weaponry—at least since the end of World War II.

Technological development and sociological processes of elite cooptation are what make it viable today.

Declassified Washington archives confirm that this imperial division of labor was drafted at the dawn of the Cold War, waiting decades for the material and political conditions to operate in full:

1949 (NATO Strategic Concept DC 6/1): Stipulated that each nation should undertake the task for which it was best suited, reserving strategic bombing for the US and assigning ground forces to allies.

1950 (NSC 56/2 Directive): Concluded that Latin American militaries should handle regional security to minimize the diversion of US forces from the main war effort.

1956 (Defense Secretary Wilson’s Directive to NATO): Ordered allies to assume increasing or complete responsibility for their own force maintenance and conventional matériel requirements, while Washington retained command, control, and high-tech strategic weaponry. In late 2026, this design is taking shape in Port-au-Prince across three overlapping tracks: The multilateral track (UN): The October 18 abduction of four Salvadoran aviation technicians embedded in the Gang Suppression Force (GSF)—according to the official narrative—provided the immediate pretext.

The mercenary track: Vectus Global—Erik Prince’s successor to Blackwater—hired Salvadoran operators to conduct lethal drone campaigns and police customs and borders.

The unilateral deployment: Nayib Bukele sent over 2,000 soldiers outside UN command following Donald Trump’s phone-call green light to “do what you have to do.”

Cross-referencing unclassified 2025–2026 US strategic literature with the facts on the ground confirms my theoretical framework of the Bunker State and NATO 3.0 (its most crystallized example) across four structural dimensions: What is shifted and what is retained US strategy documents never speak of withdrawal.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) pairs “partner”-led operations with retained US unilateral strike capacity, replicating the 1949 logic of DC 6/1. Seventy-seven years on, the pattern remains intact: boots on the ground, casualties, legal exposure, and political attrition are externalized to the periphery; strategic airlift, intelligence, strike capacity, and the power to convene stay at the center.

Burden-shifting redistributes risk under the retained command of the enabling layer. In Haiti, the Salvadoran army could not even have arrived without SOUTHCOM and Colombian Aerospace Force Lockheed C-130 aircraft: logistical dependency is total. Informality as a mode of organization Bukele’s deployment lacks a published international mandate, operates outside both the UN and the Shield of the Americas, and was greenlit via an informal presidential remark while the State Department sidestepped the proxy label.

Anyone searching only for formal treaties will miss the operation, and anyone claiming a formal command plan will be easily refuted. The organizing principle is plausible deniability: the National Security Strategy supplies the permission structure by calling to enlist “regional champions” operating beyond their borders, leaving specific operations to emerge from those peripheries. The initiative of peripheral elites The documents do not show Washington forcibly conscripting El Salvador, but rather Bukele volunteering.

SOUTHCOM reports partners eager to assume subregional leadership, CSIS advises governments to offer themselves as “regional champions,” and the National Security Strategy promises to reward and back aligned governments, parties, and movements. A transatlantic core stratum thus articulates with peripheral elites competing to climb the imperial hierarchy while pursuing domestic electoral motives (such as Bukele’s 2027 reelection), drastically lowering the cost of running the system. This also validates América Insumisa’s preference for outsourcing over Ruy Mauro Marini’s subimperialism: unlike Nixon-era Brazil, El Salvador lacks a capital-export base of its own; what it exports is a counterinsurgency method and soldiers.

Territorial reclassification is literal US defense and think-tank texts explicitly sort territory by military function: they speak of “key terrain,” a “defensive perimeter around Eurasia,” a “third border,” or a “southeast maritime border,” scoring ports on a 100-point risk index and flagging 23 regional port projects for potential wartime use. That is the Bunker State thesis in the establishment’s own vocabulary.

The technological leap is equally concrete: in 1965 (the Dominican Republic), only US forces could fight and sustain themselves compared to the Inter-American Force; in 2026, armed drones, mercenary intelligence, and partner helicopters allow a small Central American army to run offensive urban operations abroad, while Washington controls the strategic airlift bottleneck (and almost certainly much more). Technology lowers the threshold for the periphery to absorb human attrition while deepening its structural dependence on the center.

The strategic reality in the Caribbean

In short, the evidence fully backs Contralínea’s reading. Under the familiar pretext of fighting gangs and drug trafficking, Haiti is being integrated into a Caribbean access-and-denial architecture designed to block “dual-use” infrastructure and maritime chokepoints against “rivals” like China, tightening the encirclement of Cuba (and potentially Mexico). In this deliberately informal division of labor, an aligned peripheral government supplies the infantry, a private contractor supplies the lethal drones, and Washington supplies the political permission and strategic airlift.

Watch this excellent program from Contralínea: (English subtitles autodubbed)

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