Is the Great War Knocking on the Doors of Lebanon and Syria??

Israel has decided to expand its attack on Lebanon.

By – Elijah J. Magnier.

Since the war on Gaza began, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has taken increasingly complex and intensive steps to deflect blame for the failure of October 7 onto the security and military apparatus. He has also pointed fingers at his powerful army for not achieving the political goals he outlined at the start of the war on Gaza. Despite this, Netanyahu has made a series of consequential decisions to devastate Gaza’s Strip, temporarily occupy parts of it as a buffer zone, and maintain forces in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors. His occupation forces also remain relatively engaged in the West Bank and along the northern frontiers of Lebanon and Syria.

On the northern front with Lebanon, Israeli officials have issued a stream of threats hinting at the possibility of a major war. This has been paired with military manoeuvres along the borders of Lebanon and Syria, signalling a potential ground offensive aimed at cutting off supply routes into Lebanon. Such a move would create – as some Israeli officials believe – a new reality, allowing Israel to negotiate the return of over one hundred thousand settlers displaced by the thousands of Hezbollah strikes in support of the Al-Aqsa Flood. Is there any realism to such a broader war scenario? In the realm of warfare, nothing is entirely impossible.

Israel has seemingly lost its strategic compass after eleven months of fighting on multiple fronts, failing to adopt a clear strategy for an “absolute victory”. Instead, Netanyahu has opted for a plan of patience, awaiting the outcome of the upcoming US presidential election in two months. This election, he believes, will clarify the political and military path forward, as well as his political future.

Netanyahu has capitalised on the current US administration’s constraints, leveraging President Joe Biden’s inability to take decisive action. Although he agrees to remove Hamas from power, Biden’s reluctance to end the war stems from fears that any step he takes might be seen as undermining America’s support for Israel—support that is central to US national security due to religious, economic, political, and ideological considerations. However, the outcome of the US elections will inevitably shape a new reality. This may embolden Netanyahu to prolong the war with full American backing or force him to halt it immediately. The time for evasion may soon be over.

Not only has Netanyahu failed to secure “absolute victory,” but Israeli leadership has also revealed that Hamas has successfully recruited 3,000 new fighters in the devastated northern Gaza Strip. This directly contradicts the claim made by Defense Minister Yoav Galant, who announced that “the mission was completed in Gaza,” despite neither destroying Hamas nor rescuing the kidnapped soldiers. It’s no surprise, given that Netanyahu tends to make decisions without consulting his defence minister or considering the views of the security and military leadership. Galant, not Netanyahu, recently stated that “the military focus will shift to the north,” even though the 98th Paratroopers and Commandos Division and the 162nd Armored Division, the most potent and experienced divisions in the Israeli army, remain stationed in Gaza.

In recent weeks, exchanges of fire on the Lebanese front have intensified, but they remain within the rules of engagement established at the start of the conflict. This does not necessarily suggest that a full-scale war is on the horizon. According to informed military sources, it’s “possible, though not certain, that Israel may conduct a major military operation without committing to a ground invasion, instead relying on its air force.” These sources point to two competing views within the Israeli army leadership.

One group believes that Hezbollah can be countered by inflicting significant damage on Israeli camps, buildings, and military targets, following a ratio of roughly two Israeli targets destroyed for every ten Hezbollah targets. This camp argues that Israel’s air force could destroy around 13,000 targets—including positions, offices, leadership facilities, and military camps—effectively setting Hezbollah back several years without excessive civilian harm on either side.

However, another group raises concerns: “What if we fail to neutralise Hezbollah’s key capabilities fully and incur heavy losses, even if our military forces seek shelter from known bases to more fortified positions to reduce casualties?” This group fears that Hezbollah, using its missile and drone capabilities, which have not yet been deployed, could cause significant damage. Such a scenario could expose vulnerabilities in Israel that might encourage its enemies—or even its allies—to exploit perceived weaknesses, thereby enhancing Hezbollah’s power and reputation.

The sources suggest that Israel’s leadership has yet to reach a final, unified decision. Even though escalating the Lebanese front could align with Netanyahu’s goals of keeping Israel in a state of perpetual conflict, no definitive military plan has been settled. The army is still working on securing sufficient fire cover for its forces and bases deep inside the controlled territories. It remains cautious about whether its interception deterrence capabilities against missiles and drones are robust enough to confront Hezbollah and escalate the conflict.

Netanyahu has yet to accept the reality on the Lebanese front and remains unwilling to come to terms with the current situation and Hezbollah’s Rule of Engagement. This is why he disagrees with the military leadership’s assessment that the conflict with Lebanon will naturally cease when the Gaza front is resolved. In Netanyahu’s view, Hezbollah’s ability to impose a deterrence on what is considered the strongest army in the Middle East is wholly unacceptable. He hesitates to concede to this situation and may try to alter the equation.

The Lebanese front, however, is far from an easy battleground, especially given the significance of the Syrian front, which is no less critical. In Syria, there are missile and special forces, both Lebanese and Iranian, that match the strength of those stationed in Lebanon. A firm decision has already been made that these forces are ready to participate in any conflict, with the approval of the Syrian leadership and Russia’s tacit consent, should Israel launch a major (aerial or ground) war on Lebanon.

Syria serves as Hezbollah’s primary logistical corridor and a crucial centre for producing various missiles, including the medium-range Fateh 360, the long-range Fateh 110, advanced Scud missiles with an integrated modern GPS, and Burkan missiles. As a result, it is a continuous target for Israeli strikes, the most recent being the bombing of missile factories in the Hama resort and other areas. This makes Damascus a key partner in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” conflict.

Syria has reached an advanced stage in missile production, with factories capable of producing the raw materials, advanced technology, and expertise necessary to supply hundreds of missiles to the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance forces. These missiles, along with drones, are being used in the thousands to shell Israeli positions from Lebanon’s northern border. This isn’t new for Syria; it provided missiles to Hezbollah during the 2006 war, some of which were labelled “Made in Latakia” by Israel, which protested Syria’s direct involvement in supporting Hezbollah. However, at that time, Israel did not dare to strike Syria directly, a stark contrast to the situation today.

The notion of an Israeli ground invasion through either the Syrian or Lebanese front is an unrealistic scenario. Both fronts are heavily fortified and prepared for confrontation, similar to the Lebanese front. Therefore, the likelihood of Israel deploying infantry and mechanised forces into these areas remains slim.

Netanyahu is the ultimate decision-maker regarding war or peace. He is well aware that a ground confrontation would be tantamount to political suicide and prefers to maintain the current state of exchanges of fire with different intensities. Should the scope of the conflict widen, the conflict could extend across southern Lebanon, northern regions beyond the Litani River, and possibly even targets within Beirut and its suburbs.

An escalation of the war at this moment does not serve the interests of both US presidential candidates, particularly given the sensitivities of Arab-American voters. As such, a large-scale war against Lebanon and Syria seems unlikely in the immediate future. The current focus remains on managing the conflict until more favourable conditions arise for Netanyahu or he decides to shift his expansionist ambitions and bring the Gaza war to a conclusion at a time that best suits his political calculations.

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💠 @ejmalrai:
⭕ A ground invasion is not expected. #Israel cannot invade #Lebanon or #Syria, but it can use its air force, continue to destroy, and extend the bombing to new areas. #Hezbollah can follow suit and reach #Haifa gradually and, if necessary, depending on how far Israel would go. Expect more IDPs [internally displaced persons] on both sides. Netanyahu wants a permanent war.
⭕ If #Israel expands the area of attack, I wouldn’t be surprised to see 200,000 Israeli refugees in the near future. What is certain is that @Netanyahu has finally admitted he doesn’t want the Israeli captives held in #Gaza. He doesn’t want them back. Netanyahu wants to survive.
⭕ Don’t focus on what #Israel can do, but on #Hezbollah’s ability to inflict severe damage on Israel. This is why @Netanyahu is too cowardly to go to a larger war with #Lebanon.

Netanyahu wants the war to continue, but he is not suicidal