How should Moscow respond to threats from its Baltic neighbors

From Dmitry Trenin, first posted at https://profile.ru/politics/kak-moskva-dolzhna-reagirovat-na-ugrozy-sosedej-po-baltijskomu-regionu-1564142/

Translated with Yandex, although there is also a translation available at RT and this article is generally widely posted in journals dealing with international, geopolitical and geopolitical economics : Dmitry Trenin: Here’s how Russia can prevent WW3

Dmitry Trenin is a research professor at the Higher School of Economics and a lead research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He is also a member of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

He served in the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Russian Federation, was a liaison officer in the foreign relations department of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Potsdam); senior lecturer at the Military Institute; employee of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva; Senior Research Fellow at the NATO War College (Rome). From 2008 to 2022, he was the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin is also the author of more than 10 books and monographs published in Russia, the US, Germany, China and other countries.

It should be noted that although Mr Trenin talks about the Baltics, it is not really the Baltics, but Washington that is the problem. We have to use the words “Full Spectrum Dominance” again.

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The “Ukrainian crisis” is an inaccurate name for what is happening now in relations between Russia and the West. This confrontation is global in scope. It covers almost all functional areas – from finance to pharmaceuticals and sports-and, in addition, extends to many geographical regions. In Europe, which has become the epicenter of this confrontation, the highest level of tension after Ukraine is now observed in the Baltic Sea. In Russia (and in the West), the question is often asked: will the Baltic region become the next theater of military operations?

In Europe and America, the scenario has long been exaggerated, according to which the Russian army will continue to move forward after the victory in Ukraine – now seeking to conquer the Baltic republics and Poland. The meaning of this simple propaganda fantasy is clear: to convince Europeans that if you do not “invest in full” in supporting Kiev, you can get a war on your own territory. It is characteristic that almost no one in the EU dares to publicly ask questions: is Russia interested in a direct armed conflict with NATO, what goals does it intend to pursue in such a war, and what price is it willing to pay? It is obvious that simply asking such questions can lead to accusations of spreading Russian propaganda.

Russia, for its part, notes the provocative statements made by our north-western neighbors: Poles, Balts and Finns. They refer, in particular, to the possibility of a blockade of Kaliningrad from the sea and land, as well as the closure of the exit from the Gulf of Finland for Russia. Such statements are most often made by retired people, but sometimes active politicians and military personnel also give their voice. These threats do not cause panic among Russians: decisions of this level are made not in Warsaw or Tallinn, but in Washington, but the current situation cannot be ignored.

Many years ago, the Baltic region lost its reputation as the most stable and peaceful region in Europe. After the accession of Poland (1999), Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (2004), and recently Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) to NATO, the Baltic Sea, as it is repeated with pleasure and pride in Brussels, has become a “NATO lake”. Narva (i.e. NATO) is a two-hour drive from St. Petersburg. After Finland joined the Atlantic bloc, the line of direct contact between Russia and NATO increased by 1,300 km-twice; to St. Petersburg from this border is less than 150 km. The price of Moscow’s voluntary abandonment of the principle of geopolitical deterrence at the end of the Cold War was high.

NATO’s territory has not only expanded and moved closer to the Russian border; it is also actively being equipped operationally. Corridors for quick access for NATO forces to the borders of Russia (the so-called military Schengen) have been launched; new military bases are being built and existing ones are being modernized; the physical presence of the US armed forces and their allies in the region is increasing; exercises of troops, air forces and navies are taking place more intensively and on a larger scale. Washington’s announcement of its intention to deploy medium-range missiles in Germany in 2026 draws parallels with the so-called Euro-missile crisis of the early 1980s, which was considered the most dangerous period of the Cold War after the situation around Cuba in October 1962.

The situation developing in the north-western direction forces Moscow to strengthen the strategy of military deterrence of the enemy. A number of steps have already been taken. In order to strengthen non-nuclear deterrence, the Leningrad Military District has been recreated, and new formations and units are being formed where they have not existed for a long time. The military integration of Russia and Belarus has made significant progress. Russian nuclear weapons have already been deployed on Belarusian territory. Exercises of non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation were held. Official warnings have been issued that, under certain conditions, military installations on the territory of NATO countries will become legitimate targets for Russian strikes. The modernization of the Russian Federation’s nuclear doctrine has been announced. Nuclear deterrence is becoming a more active tool of Russian strategy, turning into nuclear deterrence of the enemy.

It remains to be hoped that Washington understands that a naval blockade of Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg would mean a casus belli-a reason to declare war. The current US administration does not seem to want a major war with Russia. History shows, however, that wars sometimes occur when neither side seems to want them. The strategy of creeping escalation of the conflict with the aim of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, which the United States has chosen in the protracted proxy war in Ukraine, is fraught with the danger of just such a scenario, when the logic of the once-launched process begins to determine political and military decisions and the situation quickly gets out of control.

Another danger is that Washington actually encourages not only irresponsible rhetoric, but also irresponsible actions of American satellites. The latter, convinced of their impunity, may go too far in mindlessly provoking Moscow and thereby lead the United States and Russia to a direct armed clash. Again, we can only hope that the American instinct for self-preservation will be stronger than arrogance.

Hopes are hopes, but it is obvious that Russia has already exhausted its reserve of verbal warnings. Hostile moves by opponents do not require condemnation, but suppression, and in any case, an adequate response. Now the question is about the airfields of NATO countries, including Poland, where the F-16 aircraft transferred to Kiev will be based; about possible attempts from the Estonian and Finnish sides to disrupt navigation in the Gulf of Finland; about the prospect of Lithuania stopping railway communication between Kaliningrad and the main territory of Russia under various pretexts, as well as about significant threats to our an ally of Belarus. A tough response at an early stage in the development of each of these plots has a better chance of stopping a dangerous escalation. Of course, the most powerful position for Russia is the attitude to active actions, following a preventive strategy, when Moscow does not respond to the escalating steps of the enemy, but itself has a strategic initiative.

It should be borne in mind that after the end of active military operations in the Ukrainian direction, Russia’s confrontation with the collective West will continue. From the Arctic, which is a separate area of competition, to the Black Sea, there is already a solid dividing line, without gaps. European security has ceased to be an actual concept, and Eurasian security, which also extends to the European component, is still a matter of the distant future. A long period of “non-peace” lies ahead, during which Russia will be able to rely in the security sphere not on agreements with Western states, but only on its own forces and capabilities. In the foreseeable future, the Baltic region-this seemingly promising, but never-completed “assemblage point” of Greater Europe-will probably be the most militarized and hostile part of the European neighborhood to Russia. How stable this neighborhood will be depends, of course, on the achievement of the goals of the CBO.