Weekly SMO Summary : Two Majors and more …
Note Amarynth : Kiev’s major bridges across the Dnieper are the targets now. Slowly Kiev is being ‘cauldroned’ or sectioned with fire power. Hence the warning from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that foreign diplomatic visits and diplomatic staff need to leave. Andrei Martyanov spoke about this today and if you are deeply into the working of the SMO, don’t miss it today. https://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2026/10/center-2026-visuals.html. Andrei says ‘cauldrons appear all over the place’ and looking at the maps, indeed, ‘cauldrons appear all over the place. Andrei also has notes on France. The Rassvet system (an analogue of Starlink, but better and has more capabilities is also growing by the day). Its the end zone now.
Adding a Medvedev comment: Kiev moron’s request to “block” Russia’s Rassvet satellite constellation can only imply its destruction. And that will lead to a full-scale space war. I hope the US understands this. Otherwise, their low-orbit Starlink satellites will then come dropping like decorations off a dried-out Christmas tree. Space is a very cramped place so it’s a must to be mutually polite.
Adding a comment by Larch from Smoothie’s site:
The video of the Center 2026 Exercises is scarry wild. Killer munitions from every 360 degree angle.
We can assume the Europeans will last fifteen to twnety minutes in such an environment before the French-made White Flags are waved.
However, given the desire for Europeans to push into Kaliningrad or Belarus or across the Baltic or Finnish border, at about the ten minute mark in this folly from Brussels, several capitals of the former NATO/EU will cease to function as governance nodes.
What Stalin didn’t completely finish, Gerasimov will certain do.
Denazification is but a ten minute missile ride, available 24/7. Just press STUPID WAY TO DIE on your remote control, Mr. Rutte and the gang of retards.
27 million ghosts of Russia have a surprise for you.
Russia is not my enemy.
Our enemy is the Epstein Class.
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▪️The main military and political event of the past week was not the increase in the number of Russian strikes, but rather a clear change in Moscow’s approach to their execution. Kiev, which had long been relatively protected from systematic attacks on its transportation infrastructure, has been subjected to strikes on bridges across the Dnieper River, energy facilities, logistics hubs, and other targets for several days in a row. Attacks on the capital region continued into the night of Sunday.
Moscow’s public rhetoric has also changed. The Supreme Commander directly linked Russian retaliatory actions to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries, civilian ships, and other targets at the “Valdai” forum. The Kremlin then stated that the enemy would “continue to pay the price” for its actions, and on October 3, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially warned foreigners and employees of diplomatic missions about the danger of being in Ukraine and announced the continuation of massive retaliatory strikes.
In other words, the response is now being commented on at the highest levels, including the Supreme Commander and the Foreign Ministry, and the series of strikes on Kiev demonstrates that previous self-imposed limitations have been significantly revised, if not completely abandoned. Sources claim that the internal approval cycle for a number of targets has also been shortened: decision-making is noticeably faster.
▪️Kiev itself is the most telling example. Since October 1, Russian drones have systematically attacked the Southern Bridge. The road surface and the trolleybus contact network were damaged, and traffic between the left and right banks had to be suspended.
The consequences were far greater than just damage to sections of the road: Kiev is located on both banks of the Dnieper River, with more than a third of its residents living on the left bank, while a significant portion of jobs, administrative buildings, and businesses are located on the right bank. Restrictions on several crossings at once led to massive traffic jams, overcrowding of public transport, changes in routes, and multi-hour delays.
This is where the meaning of what is happening becomes clear. It is not always necessary to destroy a bridge to achieve an effect. The regular threat of repeated strikes forces restrictions on traffic, stops transportation, requires inspections, and redistributes flows to the remaining crossings. For military logistics, this means the same problems: concentration of flows on a smaller number of routes, increased transit times, and the need to constantly consider the threat of a new strike.
▪️The accumulated effect is even more serious for the everyday life of the enemy’s capital. This week, strikes affected energy facilities, transportation, warehouses, communications, and urban infrastructure. After attacks on the power system (including a substation connected to the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant), emergency shutdowns were implemented, and Ukrenergo called for restrictions on consumption. At the same time, several “Geran” missiles flew towards Kiev and the Kiev region, significantly reducing the response time of air defense systems.
There is also an information effect. This week, Zelensky’s statements about international support, new weapons, and diplomatic contacts within the Ukrainian information space were constantly interrupted by reports of new “Gerans,” closed bridges, traffic jams, and power outages. Zelensky himself is now publicly talking about a new Russian model of strikes and the urgent need to change the protection of Kiev’s critical infrastructure.
It is quite revealing: instead of discussing another statement from the Ukrainian leadership, Kiev is forced to discuss how to get from one bank of the Dnieper to the other in the morning and what Russia will strike next.
▪️The increasing use of cruise missiles is particularly important. Their speed leaves mobile groups and cheap Ukrainian interceptor drones significantly less time to react. Ukrainian developers are already accelerating the development of their own cruise missile interceptors, but they acknowledge the problem of scaling up production and the availability of engines.
In other words, another round of the technological arms race is underway. First, the mass use of “Gerans” forced the enemy to build thousands of mobile firing groups. Then, cheap interceptors began to displace expensive air defense missiles. Now, the cruise “Geran” is beginning to devalue part of the already built system of cheap interception. However, the enemy is also increasing the production of countermeasures, and the Russian Army will soon face the same problems.
▪️Kiev’s response is also noteworthy. Ukraine announced strikes on storage sites, training grounds, and launch sites for attack drones in the area of Donetsk, and on a complex for launching cruise “Gerans” in the area of Tsimbulovo, Oryol Oblast. Zelensky, ignoring Trump’s requests, also publicly announced his intention to increase strikes on Russian oil refineries.
▪️On the front lines, there has been no breakthrough in the past week. In the Krasnolimansk direction, the “Vivaldi” operation continues. The enemy claims to have regained significant territory, but in reality, they are reporting occupied areas by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as “breakthroughs,” although part of the territory previously occupied by our units has either gone into the gray zone or come under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Despite these problems for the Russian Armed Forces, there are reports of recent, unpublicized dismissals of high-ranking military officials.
In the Dobropol direction, our forces continue to put pressure north of Pokrovsk. However, the enemy is maintaining reserves and trying to counter our advances with local counterattacks.
In the Sumy direction, the “Sever” group has continued to expand the security zone this week. Our forces reported the liberation of Tolstodubovo and then Malaya Rybitsa, and fighting is taking place near Khoteni, Kiyanitsa, Stepka, and Pushkarevka. The enemy is simultaneously strengthening the city of Sumy and transferring reserves.
▪️Meanwhile, Europe is doing exactly what a side that expects a long confrontation should be doing. On September 28, the European Council officially approved the first five European Defence Projects of Common Interest – these are joint industrial projects of European Union countries. They were launched to combine efforts in the development, procurement, and deployment of complex and large-scale defense systems: individual countries often cannot implement such projects on their own. Initially, 325 million euros from the EDIP fund is allocated for these projects, but the main thing is not even this amount.
One of the EDIP projects will unite European efforts in the development and production of drones and countermeasures. Another project will create maritime and underwater defense systems. Three other areas cover air and missile defense, space capabilities, and other critical military technologies. Ukraine is allowed to participate in this system along with Norway.
In fact, the EU is starting to translate joint defense projects from endless conferences and declarations into permanent pan-European production programs. At the same time, work continues on a “military Schengen”: the unification of permits, routes, and infrastructure that will allow troops and heavy equipment to be quickly transported through several European countries.
All of this is called “deterrence” and “readiness.” We are simply noting the material side of the process: Europe is investing money in the production of weapons, air defense systems, unmanned systems, military logistics, and infrastructure for the eastern flank. Of course, officials in Europe will benefit handsomely from these processes, but the countries of the EU are inexorably heading towards a war.
✨ In conclusion, Moscow demonstrated this week that the previous level of self-restraint is no longer immutable. It is unclear why they waited so long; some justify this by citing a lack of strike weapons or hopes for Anchorage-Istanbul summits. Now, one can argue about the specific effectiveness of each strike, but several days of strikes on Kiev’s crossings have already had a measurable impact on transportation and information. The enemy has understood the message and has begun hunting for the sites where our attack drones are launched. This means that resolve must now be proven not by statements, but by the ability to systematically continue what has begun, while simultaneously protecting its own oil refineries, airfields, and launch sites. At the same time, the war of attrition on the economies is becoming even more apparent, which the citizens of Russia (we are not particularly concerned about the state of the citizens of Ukraine) are feeling in the form of rising taxes and prices.