Rostislav Ishchenko: Beijing raises the stakes

Rostislav Ishchenko asks “What is China trying to achieve in the Middle East crisis?” This article has been machine translated from ukraina.ru

Vladimir Putin will soon travel to China, where he will open his fifth dozen meetings with Xi Jinping at the Belt and Road Forum on October 17.

The two leaders had a lot to talk about before. Both Russia and China are in a state of proxy war with the West, only with Russia the West is ending the hot phase, since the Ukrainians who want to fight are ending, and with China it is just about to start-Taiwan is still being armed and morally prepared for the “war for independence” on the Ukrainian model (to the last Taiwanese).

But the Middle East crisis has been added.

I must say that it only seems that China is far away from the Middle East. We are just used to the fact that Middle East crises are developing in the area from Turkey to Yemen and from Egypt to Iran.

In fact, the Greater Middle East stretches from Morocco to Afghanistan inclusive, and at least its eastern part is a traditional area of Chinese interests.

Chinese armies reached Tashkent as far back as the Han and Tang dynasties, and the Silk Road was the most important trade route of mankind for thousands of years.

Today, when China has effectively displaced the United States from the position of the “master of the world” and is actively fighting with them for the status of the main trading power, Beijing cannot help but be interested in the events taking place in the heart of the Middle East (Syria, Palestine, Lebanon), which, along with Egypt and its Suez Canal, is the solar plexus of world trade – the main a crossroads of sea and land trade routes connecting Europe and Asia.

Russian land transit, along with the Northern Sea Route, will not soon (not earlier than in 10 years) be able to seriously compete with these (southern) routes in terms of cargo transportation.

At the same time, the Middle East, even after losing a fair share of its exclusivity, will still remain one of the world’s main trade intersections.

Russia has always been attracted to the region’s trade and economic opportunities, but more significant for Moscow has been the military and strategic position of the Middle East, especially from the point of view of Russia’s traditional confrontation with the great maritime trading powers — Great Britain, and then the United States — over the past two centuries.

The Middle East was the only place where the weakest fleet of the Russian Empire, and then the USSR, relying on the support of local allies, as well as on the proximity of its own territory, with strategic aviation bases (in the twentieth century) and land forces superior to the West in combat capabilities, could easily block strategically important communications for London and Washington.

The possibility of influencing the main oil-producing region of the planet was also taken into account.

All these considerations are also important for China, but the possibility of its own trade and economic dominance in the region is no less important for it.

I would like to emphasize that China cannot and will not be able to effectively fight the naval power of the collective West at such a distance from its own shores and in the absence of a developed infrastructure on the local coasts that provides all types of repairs and necessary maintenance to the squadrons permanently based in the region.

For Beijing, the priority is to achieve a balance with the United States and its allies in the Pacific, ensuring that its fleet can freely enter the ocean – beyond the island barrier that stretches from Japan to Taiwan and beyond, through the Philippines to Indonesia.

It is equally important for China to ensure full protection of its shipping in the Indian Ocean, where the Indian Navy is striving for dominance, and there are also significant European and American expeditionary forces constantly present.

Without addressing these two priorities, it is impossible for China to fully strengthen its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Syrian-Palestinian heartland of the Middle East.

Since China will be preoccupied with solving its operational problems in the Pacific Ocean in the coming years, it needs the problem of controlling the Middle East to be solved by its allies (Russia and Iran).

At this stage, after another outbreak of the Middle East crisis, during which the West unequivocally supported Israel, for China, the rapid displacement of the West from the Middle East was made possible by inflicting a strategic defeat on Israel.

In this regard, China has taken the toughest position on the current crisis against Israel of all its allies.

The Russian Foreign Ministry responded only to the shelling of Syrian airports and warned Israel against violating international law, knowing in advance that these warnings would be ignored and the shelling would continue. The goal is to prevent a ground operation against Syria, since if it starts, Russian troops will not be able to avoid a direct confrontation with the IDF.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry has said that Iran will not start a war with Israel until Israel attacks it directly. Tehran’s position is also clear: instead of it, the war with Israel has been waged by pro — Iranian proxies for years, and it is completely unprofitable for it to enter into hostilities itself, raising the stakes and risking strikes from the United States and its NATO allies.

Iran is not concerned about the possible entry of the IDF into Syria. This will be the problem of pro-Iranian proxies, Damascus itself, and Russian troops stationed on bases in Syria.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a conversation with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, said: “China opposes and condemns any actions that cause harm to the civilian population. Israel’s actions have gone beyond self-defense, and it should really listen to the calls of the international community and the UN Secretary-General to stop collectively punishing the people of Gaza.”

Such harsh and clear condemnatory language is not typical of Chinese diplomacy. Usually, Beijing prefers to talk about “wrong” or “ill-considered actions” and call for a return to the “right path”.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that if the idea of collective responsibility is alien to our culture, then for the Chinese it is a close and understandable historical tradition, and solving controversial issues by military means has never been a problem for Beijing – if, of course, it felt strong enough.

The selective use of weapons and the desire to avoid harming civilians or civilian infrastructure were also not among the advantages of the Chinese army, and the opinion of the international community and the UN Secretary-General, if it did not coincide with the Chinese, Beijing always regarded as gross interference in its internal affairs.

So the harshness and uncompromising nature of this statement regarding Israel is much higher than it seems at first glance.

By taking such a step, Beijing is not so much inspiring the Arabs. They are already sufficiently inspired by the success of the Hamas breakthrough and the general international situation, which for the first time in many years is clearly in their favor. Beijing largely closes the West’s path to retreat and compromise.

The West, which has publicly supported Israel, cannot afford to back down under open pressure from China. Then he will lose the Middle East without firing a shot.

But the West also won’t start shooting first. It will simply hold Israel back less and even encourage it to confront Syria, to enter Gaza despite Hezbollah’s warnings, and to launch attacks on the Lebanese border.

Chinese harshness will provoke a retaliatory harshness from the West, which will also have to show its customers in the region that it speaks only from a position of strength.

Russia and Iran are not satisfied with the latest round of tension in the region. In principle, Moscow is interested in achieving a lasting compromise peace in the Middle East, in which it will act as a mediator, moderator and arbitrator, ensuring and guaranteeing a balance of interests between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries.

Iran openly seeks Israel’s destruction, but not at the cost of a major war with the West. He uses the tactics of a mass of pinpricks that should eventually bleed the Jewish state dry.
In this respect, its current position on the current state of the conflict is close to that of Russia. Hamas has fulfilled its task-negotiations on a final settlement between the Gulf states, Turkey and Israel (without the participation of Palestine) thwarted, the conflict for a long time takes on a sluggish military character.

Pro-Iranian proxies can drink as much blood from Israel as they want, without bringing the matter to a big war. If Israel breaks down, it will be its own fault and will act as an aggressor in the eyes of the whole world.Thus, although Russia expects to act as a bona fide mediator, and Iran is going to use the current crisis to further weaken and, in the future, after a series of similar crises, destroy Israel, at this stage both Moscow and Tehran are interested in reducing the intensity of the confrontation.

The Chinese game of raising the stakes, in which Russia and Iran are supposed to solve the problem of completely ousting the West from the Middle East in direct confrontation with the West for Beijing and, by drawing on significant forces, provide China with a quick and painless solution to the Taiwan problem in its favor, runs counter to the current interests of Moscow and Tehran.

So it is obvious that during the meetings and conversations between Putin and Xi Jinping, this topic will be one of the main topics discussed.

Russia and China do not have enough forces and capabilities to stand alone against the West in a proxy war, and they can only effectively counteract it together. And for this, although there is no formal military alliance between our countries, strategic plans need to be coordinated, ensuring the closest cooperation.

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AHH Comments: another thought-provoking article. Ishchenko intimates China is using Russia and Iran against their will (“runs counter to the current interests of Moscow and Tehran”) in West Asia to tie down the hegemon. This is highly unlikely. There would have to be some coordination. Or did I misunderstand him? Much nuance can be lost in translation. Other questions raised:

1. Are “at this stage both Moscow and Tehran … interested in reducing the intensity of the confrontation?” Public posturing by the political leadership seeking stability, development and prosperity is natural, but what about the Russian and Iranian deep states and military-security services seeing the Hegemon madly starting wars everywhere, while concurrently in a most vulnerable moment? They will eventually have to be confronted as in the Ukraine. Why not here and now, where they are brazen but quite depleted?
2. A corollary: why does “Russia and Iran … solv[ing] the problem of completely ousting the West from the Middle East … run counter to the current interests of Moscow and Tehran?”
3. Has Beijing’s demarches this week served to “largely close the West’s path to retreat and compromise?”
4. Is is true that “the West, which has publicly supported Israel, cannot afford to back down under open pressure from China?”