A cautious prediction: What will international relations look like in 2026?
The author is the Director of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at the Higher School of Economics and a Leading Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
[For interest and while we have the controversy raging on the Carlson-Karaganov interview ongoing, it is worth mentioning that Dmitry Trenin and Karaganov share similar views, and regularly author papers together. Here is one well worth reading: https://karaganov.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/from-restraining-to-deterring-1.pdf. As the Western neo-barbarians accuse Prof Karaganov of being an “elite Kremlin propagandist targeting the Western expert audience”, so Trenin is accused.]
Experience shows that making predictions, even for such a relatively short-term perspective as the next year, is a risky endeavor. There is a high chance of quickly realizing one’s own naivety and inability to see things that seem obvious in hindsight. Nevertheless, it is always interesting to try to look into the future and identify key trends in international relations. What will happen on the global stage in 2026?
Special Military Operation
A peace agreement on Ukraine that would be acceptable to Russia is unlikely to be reached in 2026. European ruling elites, with the support of the US Democratic Party and the deep state, are likely to block Donald Trump’s efforts to achieve peace on terms acceptable to Moscow. Moreover, for domestic political reasons, Trump himself may “turn against” Russia, tightening sanctions on its energy exports and taking action against its “shadow fleet” tankers. Under these conditions, the Kremlin’s “special diplomatic operation,” which has been ongoing since early 2025, will be forced to halt, while the special military operation will continue with renewed vigor.
The fighting in Ukraine is likely to continue throughout 2026. The Russian army will advance, recapturing parts of the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, which are currently under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian forces will also expand their buffer zones in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions and potentially advance in other areas. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will have to retreat, but with the help of military and financial support from European countries and increased mobilization in Ukraine, they will be able to hold the line.
At the same time, the fighting will become increasingly brutal, especially on the part of the desperate enemy. There will be more bloody provocations aimed at psychologically destabilizing the Russian population. The restraint shown in response (“we are fighting the regime, not the people”) will give the enemy a false impression of our weakness and indecisiveness, encouraging them to engage in more daring actions. As a result, Russia will have to abandon certain taboos.
The theater of war will continue to expand implicitly beyond the territories of Ukraine and Russia. In response to “anonymous” attacks on tankers carrying Russian oil and facilities in our deep rear, there will be “quiet” retaliatory sabotage against targets belonging to European states engaged in a proxy war against Russia. Joint actions by Ukrainians and Europeans with more serious consequences will trigger retaliatory strikes, possibly not only against Ukraine. The ongoing Russian-European “undeclared war” will become more intense, although it is unlikely to lead to a direct large-scale military conflict in 2026.
Ukraine
The current Kiev regime will remain in power in 2026, but it is likely to rotate its top echelons. If Zelensky is forced to resign due to a corruption scandal, he will be replaced by the “heavyweight” Zaluzhny or, more likely, the more “flexible” Budanov (who has long been on the Russian list of terrorists and extremists). Kiev will be fully controlled by the Europeans. The situation in Ukraine will worsen, but the mass “sobering up” of the population will not happen yet: the most active part of Ukrainians is strongly anti-Russian.
Europe
Europe will remain a geographical stronghold of liberal globalism. Despite the low popularity of the governments of the leading countries in the region – Great Britain, Germany and France-in 2026, all of them will be able to stay in power. The “change of European elites,” which some see as a condition for normalizing Russia’s relations with its Western neighbors, will not happen soon.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, British Prime Minister Kir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and French President Emmanuel Macron (from left to right), after talks in London
Vladimir Zelensky, Kir Starmer, Friedrich Merz, and Emmanuel Macron after the talks in London, December 8, 2025
Europeans will be preparing not so much for a war with Russia, but for a long-term military confrontation with it, following the model of the Cold War. This confrontation, presented as “the defense of European freedom and civilization against Russian barbarism,” has already become the main unifying idea of the EU. Time will tell how strong this ideological foundation is, but it will likely be sufficient for 2026.
At the same time, practical steps towards the militarization of Europe are likely to be less impressive than the high-profile statements made last year. The difficult financial situation of EU member states, the need to compensate for the US’s refusal to provide direct funding to Ukraine, and concerns about widespread voter discontent in the event of a sharp reduction in social spending will dampen the militaristic fervor.
The “dissent” within the EU, which today encompasses the lands of the former Austro-Hungary, will continue (although the outcome of the spring elections in Hungary is not yet clear), but its influence on the politics of a united Europe will remain limited. More importantly, the geopolitical reorientation of the United States towards the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, and its consequences – Washington’s direct rejection of support for European integration and its skepticism about further NATO expansion – could create a leadership vacuum in Europe and unleash long-suppressed (but not eliminated) tensions between individual countries.
America
The United States will celebrate its 250th anniversary of independence with a lavish 250th anniversary celebration, a G20 summit, and a FIFA World Cup. Trump will be the host of these events, and his influence will be greater than ever. However, the American president’s influence will diminish as a result of the Republicans’ almost certain loss of a majority in the House of Representatives in the November midterm elections and the growing divisions within the Republican Party between the MAGA wing and the traditional party elite. Trump will not receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2026, and he will appear to be aging and not always in his right mind. As the 2028 presidential election approaches, both parties will engage in a struggle to nominate candidates. Political polarization in the United States will intensify, but it will not lead to a new civil war.
The January operation against Venezuela reinforced the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy’s emphasis on prioritizing the Western Hemisphere. It is likely that Venezuela will not be the only target. In 2026, the threat will extend to left-wing regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua, with Colombia and Mexico also at risk. Additionally, Trump is expected to take action to establish full American control over Greenland. Canada’s accession to the United States is unlikely, but Washington’s pressure on Ottawa to align with American policies will intensify. Canada will not be able to “join the EU.” Trump’s focus on the Western Hemisphere will create challenges for Russia’s international reputation, especially if there is an attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime (there will be no second Cuban Missile Crisis), but it will also weaken Washington’s interest in Ukraine.
The Middle East
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will continue to “solve the security problems of the Jewish state,” and not only on the country’s borders. The issue of Iran’s missile capabilities remains a priority for him. Here, Netanyahu is counting on Trump’s assistance. Inspired by the success of the operation to capture President Nicolas Maduro, he may attempt to conduct a joint military action with Israel against the Islamic Republic, targeting Iran’s ballistic missiles. As in the 12-day war in June last year, the calculation will be that Iran’s air defense systems will not be able to provide reliable protection, and that Russia and China, having condemned the actions of West Jerusalem and Washington, will not intervene on Tehran’s behalf.
The situation in Iran itself will remain tense in 2026: the struggle for the right to inherit from the supreme leader will intensify at the top, and discontent with the difficult economic situation will lead to mass protests at the bottom. In the event of a power crisis, which may not occur in 2026, the Iranian political regime may be reshaped with a greater role for the security forces (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and a decrease in the influence of the ayatollahs. Even in this scenario, Iran will not abandon its ambitions to become a regional power, but the degree of “revolutionary” in its policies may decrease.
China
Beijing will increase its military power in many areas (nuclear weapons, missiles, naval and air forces), seeking to achieve military-strategic parity with the United States and regional superiority over it in the western Pacific. Relations between China and the United States will continue to deteriorate, but an acute crisis with a transition to armed conflict over Taiwan is unlikely.
In parallel with the Sino-American relationship, relations between Beijing and Tokyo will deteriorate. Like European countries, Japan is seeking to assert itself in its confrontation with a major neighboring power, no longer relying on automatic U.S. support. In practice, this means militarization and a willingness to complete the development of its own nuclear weapons, which could be achieved within a matter of months, if not weeks, if the decision is made.
The Korean Peninsula
The DPRK will continue to strengthen its nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its alliances with Russia and China. As a result, the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea will be countered by the alliance between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang in Northeast Asia. However, it is unlikely that the DPRK will engage in a military conflict with the Republic of Korea and/or the United States.
Russia’s Near Abroad
In the context of the ongoing military confrontation in Ukraine, integration within the Union State of Russia and Belarus will be strengthened on a military, including nuclear, basis. The weakening of Trump’s position and the increasing hostility of Europe towards Minsk will limit the prospects for Belarusian multi-vector policy.
Moldova, which has finally become a satellite of the EU, is unlikely to unleash an armed conflict with Transnistria. Most likely, the European Union will try to negotiate with the PMR elite about its distancing from Russia. The final decision on the fate of Transnistria will be made as a result of the special military operation, but this is unlikely to happen in 2026.
In Armenia, Pashinyan’s party is likely to win the June elections, and his policy of rapprochement with the West will continue, while maintaining economic ties with Russia that are beneficial for Yerevan. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is well-controlled by Washington, Ankara, Brussels, and London, and it is unlikely to flare up again in 2026. Moscow will maintain a cold but generally working relationship with Baku. A pragmatic dialogue will also be maintained with Tbilisi.
Russia’s relations with the Central Asian countries will strengthen, but they will remain primarily business-oriented. The countries of the region will collectively and individually develop their foreign policy multi-vector approach and construct their unique identities (in this process, their time as part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union will be portrayed as a temporary aberration). Both of these developments will gradually distance the region from Russia.
“The Collective West” and “the Global Majority”
Since last year, the concept of “the Collective West” has been used to refer to a shared civilization, rather than a political bloc. The shift in U.S. foreign policy from empire to metropole has deprived Europe of the privileged position it has held since the beginning of the Cold War. Europe has transformed from an object of nurturing and support into a resource for the foreign policy of “Great America.” Under these new circumstances, NATO will remain as an instrument of American dominance and control, but the European Union has effectively been declared an “obstacle” to U.S. foreign policy. This is similar to the British Empire, which was an American ally during World War II, but Washington worked to destroy it.
In 2026, we should also rethink another key concept, the “global majority,” which was successfully defined at the very beginning of the special military operation as a group of countries that did not follow the “collective West” in imposing sanctions on Russia. In other words, this was a group of current and potential partners of our country in the rapidly changing international environment, and nothing more. However, it soon became used to refer to all countries outside the Western orbit, essentially becoming a synonym for the “global non-West.” From here, it was only a step to presenting the Global Majority, organized in formats such as BRICS and the SCO, as an antithesis to the collective West with its G7, NATO, and the EU.
However, to take this step is to deceive yourself. In 2026, the “majority” is unlikely to show a desire for greater consolidation. Every “majority” country-from China to Qatar, Cambodia, and Kazakhstan – will act primarily in its own national interests, including in relations with the West. This is clearly seen in the UN votes. Last year, we witnessed armed conflicts between SCO members India and Pakistan and ASEAN members Cambodia and Thailand. On the eve of 2026, relations between the leading countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, became strained (which immediately affected the course of the war in Yemen).
Thus, in 2026, the formation of a multipolar world, a real one, rather than a desired one, will continue. In this world, the key players will be the United States and China, as well as Russia and India. They will not act on behalf of different civilizations, but they will actually represent the diversity of civilizations in the world, which is the hallmark of multipolarity. Each of these powers will focus primarily on their own development, but they will also strive to shape their geographical areas to their own liking. Something similar will happen at the regional levels, where Brazil, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and South Africa are already leading powers. The transformation of the Western world may once again give some autonomy to the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, but if this happens, it will certainly not happen this year.