UAE Abu Dhabi: The Second Baku!

These are the players in the attempt to create a anti Russia and anti China bloc made up of Stans and Turkic‑speaking states. The initial discussions of this attempt are becoming more visible in the media and commentary space. As this article has copyright, I will only publish the main points, and you can read the full article at https://english.iswnews.com/39247/abu-dhabi-the-second-baku/.

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Without doubt, in recent years the United Arab Emirates has become both a security and economic arm for the United States and Israel. Through economic projects, it advances Western‑Israeli security objectives—examples include involvement in Sudan’s conflict, support for the Rapid Support Forces, and exploitation of Sudan’s gold mines. Another example is the UAE’s entry into infrastructure and trade corridor projects in Central Asia. Recently, by signing agreements with countries in this region and the Caucasus, Abu Dhabi has sought access to the Middle Corridor, pursuing geopolitical and geo‑economic goals aligned with Tel Aviv and the West.

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UAE and the Middle Corridor

The Middle Corridor, largely composed of Turkic‑speaking states, is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Since the war in Ukraine, its importance has multiplied, as the northern route through Russia and Belarus faces security challenges. Arab investments, especially by the UAE, are now directed toward this corridor. For instance, within Dubai’s Silk Road project, the UAE successfully integrated Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into the Global Logistics Passport scheme, aiming to expand trade links across Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

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Economic Agreements

The UAE’s Masdar has launched renewable energy projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with electricity exported to Europe via undersea cables across the Caspian and Black Seas. Other Emirati firms, such as Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, have built wind power facilities in Central Asia with capacities ranging from tens to hundreds of megawatts.

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Security–Economic Objectives

The UAE’s investments in the Middle Corridor cannot be reduced to economic figures alone; they conceal strategic motives aligned with Israeli and Western agendas.

Former Israeli communications minister Ayoob Kara emphasized the need to connect the Middle Corridor via Turkey and the Mediterranean to Israel and then to Gulf Arab states: “If the Middle Corridor is built, we Israelis can connect to it. Stronger links between Turkic republics, Israel, and the Arab world will help counter Iran. We can connect via Turkey by ship, then by rail from Israel to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and onward to the UAE. This will expand trade between China, the Turkic republics, Israel, and Arab countries.”

Thus, Emirati (and potentially Saudi) support for the Middle Corridor can be seen as part of a broader Israeli plan to encircle Iran’s transit routes.

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Strategic Goals of the UAE in the Middle Corridor:

Rare minerals in Central Asia — vital for defense and technology industries. The West, heavily dependent on China, seeks alternative supplies. Recent agreements with Kazakhstan highlight the corridor’s strategic role in transferring these resources westward.
Energy diversification via the Zangezur Corridor — supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Europe, reducing reliance on Russian energy post‑Ukraine war, looks to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkmenistan, with the world’s fourth‑largest gas reserves, and Azerbaijan, aiming to double gas exports to Europe by 2027, require foreign investment. Projects like the proposed Trans‑Caspian pipeline could become feasible through Middle Corridor development.
Countering Iran’s transit routes — by aligning with Israeli and Western strategies. As corridor competition shapes the new global order, the West seeks to reinforce Israeli economic hegemony in West Asia. Iran’s geography poses the main challenge, so rival corridors like the Middle Corridor are being strengthened with Emirati support.