A Russian Aerospace Forces’ Analysis of the US Military Doctrine “Prompt Global Strike”

Editorial Note:  Our translator tells me that he has been sitting on this translation for 3 and a half years, basically because it will be unreadable to most audiences.  I trust our audience and we have MrP that we may ask to explain if it is double-dutch for those who are not educated or knowledgeable in these technologies.

A Russian Aerospace Forces’ Analysis of the US Military Doctrine “Prompt Global Strike” translated by Maxwell Scott.

Translator’s Note:

I am glad to be reminded by Professor Theodore Postol about the ‘super fuze’ nuclear warheads and their role in bolstering US confidence that it could win a nuclear conflict.

https://sovereignista.com/2024/09/01/anglo-zionists-will-launch-and-win-nuclear-war-with-both-china-and-russia/

Originally, it was envisaged that the saturation effect produced by these warheads would make it possible to destroy the Yars mobile nuclear launchers that could hide and move in forested areas, with an assumption that at least a major forest fire would engulf them whatever their precise location. Yet even with the idea that they could be used against the new Sarmat silo-launched ballistic missiles, there seem to be some questionable assumptions in current US nuclear thinking.

Firstly, it seems likely that it would not just be Russia and China that would be involved in a future nuclear war. Both North Korea and Iran would probably be coordinating their actions, with Russia especially. Both countries are already clearly doing that in terms of preparations and exchanges of weapons, and although Iran is a ‘nuclear threshold’ country its contribution would not be nuclear. Rather it would almost certainly concentrate on destroying US Navy vessels in the Gulf and Red Sea areas.

Secondly, it is worth recalling that Russia is the only country with an integrated, layered air defence system, including S-550s, S-500s,S-400s, S-350Vs, and upgraded Pantsirs, as well as others including the special missiles permitted to Moscow under one of the arms reduction treaties. Given their range of 400km, 72 S-400 complexes, each with 8 missiles, could cover the whole of Russia. It is not known if this has happened, but with an interception success rate of 92 percent, that alone would provide an important protective shield. The S-550 is claimed to have a range of thousands of kilometres, and while Andrei Martyanov thinks that this was a misprint, I do not. My guess is that they are targeted at geostationary satellites. There is also the related point that Russia in an exercise recently demonstrated that it really could get 40 million people in major cities into nuclear shelters in 10 minutes! Nuclear war probably would not finish Russia as a functioning society.

Thirdly, even if a first strike managed to eliminate all Sarmat and Yars missile complexes, and was accompanied by the destruction of all submarine ballistic missile launchers, there would still be diesel-electric submarines capable of launching hypersonic missiles. Some surface vessels are already carrying Tsirkon hypersonic missiles, and that number will only increase. In addition, there is the nuclear-powered Burevestnik [Storm Petrel] cruise missile that can fly around for years. Is that circulating in the Southern Ocean, ever ready for the signal to fly north to the USA?

Fourthly, even if all those systems failed, the Perimitr system would automatically launch all available strategic missiles on failing to detect any Russian military communications. In other words, Perimitr is a ‘dead man’s hand’ system that would take over if the Russian military leadership had been killed. It was not simply rhetoric for Putin to say that Russians would die as martyrs and their enemies would go to Hell. The system consists of five separate centres capable of acting jointly or autonomously. Their location is not known, although it is possible to assume that one is in Moscow and the other four are buried well underground. Two are probably in the southern Urals, and the other two are probably in the Arctic and the Far East.

Fifthly, US thinking seems to omit the consequences of the long-term neglect of its nuclear launch technology. This seems to have led to a series of failures of Minuteman test launches, and although the most recent one was successful, there remains a suspicion that it was ‘babied’. That is, it might be the case that every component was checked repeatedly with faulty ones replaced until there was certainty that all components actually worked. It should not be forgotten that Minuteman silos face difficulties of age and neglect. For example, the company that makes the elevators went out of business years ago and thee has been a response of resorting to block and tackle to lower supplies into the silo. Then there was the problem of narcotics use when no senior officer had visited the silos for six years. Consequently it is unclear how many missiles would actually launch in a nuclear first strike.

While the Trident system is probably in better shape, it would not just be the Poseidon long-range underwater drones that could attack them. Various Russian submarines also carry supercavitation torpedoes, against which there is no real defence.

The West should have known that Russia was not standing still technologically, because Russia officially informed the US about some parts of their weapons development programme as early as 2004, and the US finally admitted this. The problem was that Russia had not been believed, and its claims are still largely disbelieved. The ongoing Western assumption of technological superiority has led to a massive intelligence failure. The full consequences of this intelligence failure are still playing out.

The conclusion should have been that Russia is not a ‘near peer’ adversary, but rather is the most technologically advanced military power in the world. It has continued to innovate at considerable speed during the SMO, and it has the productive capacity to manufacture most weapons at scale. Where it imports weapons (on a small scale) this is more a matter of opportunity cost than a lack of capability, as exemplified in the case of Iranian Shahed drones. Even then, Russia also manufactures improved versions of the Shahed drones, with the latest version being the Goran 2. Yet the response has not been for the USA, UK, NATO and the EU to change course, but rather to double down on existing policies that include ridiculous attempts at intimidating Russia, economic sanctions against Russia and patent fabrications from Western intelligence agencies.

The article translated below appeared in the December 2020 issue of the journal Aerospace Forces, which I noticed as a reference in an article by Andrei Martyanov.

Aerospace Forces: Theory and Practice: Reviewed Electronic Periodical, No. 16, December 2020. ISSN 2500 4352, Pages 99 – 115

http://www.академия-ввс.рф/images/docs/vks/16-2020/vks_16_2020.pdf

I picked this article out as being of particular interest because it illustrates the point that Russian military forces are fully aware of US military doctrine and the related technology. It had been clear since the Western reaction to President Putin’s speech of May 2018 that the West had (as the Canadian commentator Patrick Armstrong put it) lost an arms race that it did not even know was happening.

While the collective West remains pretty clueless about the real economic, political and military situation in Russia, it is clear that Russia understands the West very well indeed and is willing to discuss its analyses in public. Now that Russia is rewriting its nuclear doctrine, it is important to understand a vital component of the existing doctrine.

🔹🔹🔹🔹

Justification of perspective directions of development of the Russian Federation’s anti-space defence system in the interests of timely detection and repulsion of the «Prompt Global Strike» means of attack.

S.I. Makarenko, A.A. Kovalskiy, I.E. Afonin

Makarenko Sergei Ivanovich, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor, Leading Researcher, St. Petersburg Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia, 199178, St. Petersburg, 14 line, 39, mak-serg@yandex.ru.

Kovalsky Alexander Alexandrovich, Ph.D. in Technical Sciences, Head of the Laboratory, Military Space Academy named after A.F. Mozhaisky, Russia, 197198, St. Petersburg, Zhdanovskaya St., 13, sake636 @ mail.ru

Afonin Ilya Evgenievich, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Aviation and Radio-Electronic Equipment, Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots, Russia, 350090, Krasnodar-5, Dzerzhinsky St., 135, ilyaafonin@yandex.ru.

Abstract: An analysis of the concept of the US Armed Forces “Prompt Global Strike” is conducted. The composition of aerospace attack weapons, planned for use, is considered, the role of space reconnaissance and target designation, communications, and navigation systems in the information support of the use of high-precision weapons in the framework of the “Prompt Global Strike” is determined. An analysis of the concept of the US Armed Forces’ “Prompt Global Strike” is presented. It is concluded that it is necessary to improve the anti-space defence system, which can play a decisive role in the preventive repulsion of the “Prompt Global Strike”. The role and place of the anti-space defence system in solving the problem of countering “Prompt Global Strike” have been determined. It is concluded that it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the anti-space defence system, and also outlined are the main directions for the development of the anti-space defence system in the interests of countering a “Prompt Global Strike” from the side of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Keywords: anti-space defence, Prompt Global Strike, aerospace attack weapons, aerospace defence, anti-satellite warfare.

Introduction: The continuous development of aerospace attack weapons [AAW] of the potential adversary, the forms of their combat use and methods of action are forcing the military-political leadership of our country to improve the structure of both the aerospace defence system (ADS) and its component-forces and means of anti-space defence, to create new models of weapons, military and special equipment (WMSE), and also to look for new forms and methods of state defence against a wide range of threats emanating from space and through space [1].

Anti-space defence (ASD) is a complex of forces, means and measures aimed at detecting and defeating (incapacitating, blocking) enemy spacecraft in order to disrupt an enemy attack from space, gain dominance in space, and ensure the stability of the functioning of its own orbital group (OG), the forces and means operating in space and through space, space control means (SCM), as well as spacecraft launch forces (SLF) and ground support [2].

Relevance. The anti-space defence (ASD) measures provide for the creation of a grouping of space, land and sea-based anti-space assets, the organization of space control, and the interception and destruction (incapacitation, blocking) of combat and support military space assets of the enemy. ASD is organized as a global system and is carried out by special complexes for detecting and intercepting space targets, spacecraft interceptors and ground-based and space-based fire complexes.

Anti-satellite warfare and satellite protection measures are separately distinguished as part of the ASD measures [3].

Anti-satellite warfare (ASW) refers to the counteraction to space systems and enemy equipment with the aim of minimizing the effectiveness of their actions and minimizing the possible damage caused by these means to the Armed Forces (AF) and the socio-economic potential of the state [3].

Satellite protection is the ensuring of the stability, including in the conditions of enemy opposition, of its space systems and military and socio-economic means, as well as the protection of space objects and means, and the prevention of discriminatory measures on the part of other states in relation to domestic space activities [3].

When implementing a set of measures to ensure the ASD, the state must take into account the geopolitical situation and the entire spectrum of military dangers and threats that exist at the given time and in the future. It is the correct definition of military dangers and threats to national security that will make it possible to develop a well-grounded military-technical policy of the state, to determine the necessary appearance of the anti-missile defence system, to form well-grounded technical solutions for the timely detection of strikes by aerospace attack weapons (AAW), threats from space, into space and through space, as well as the formation of adequate counter measures.

This article logically continues and develops the previous work of the authors [4], devoted to the issues of improving the domestic aerospace defence, considering the role and place of missile defence in solving problems of the country’s defence against the advanced concepts of an eventual adversary.

Analysis of the US Air Force Concept “Prompt Global Strike”. As shown in [4–7], during 2009–2012, the US Department of Defence has completed the formation of the operational-strategic concept “Prompt Global Strike”(PGS) and stepped up activities aimed at the practical implementation of the key provisions of this concept. The main goal of the PGS concept is to provide the US Armed Forces with the capability of high-precision impact on enemy targets in the shortest possible time at long range using a set of strike weapons in conventional or nuclear equipment. The PGS concept provides for the simultaneous strike of a large number of high-precision weapons (HPW), primarily cruise missiles (CM), against administrative and military centers, including silo launchers of the enemy, with an approximate launch rate of up to 1000 CM per day [6].

The tasks of planning, preparing and conducting combat operations in accordance with the PGS concept are assigned to the Global Strikes and Integration Command, created within the structure of the United Strategic Command of the US Armed Forces. In the practical implementation of the PGS concept, Pentagon experts are considering several possible options, while in relation to a potential conflict with the Russian Federation (RF), the following two options are of interest [4–7]:

1. “The use of the Armed Forces to forestall a nuclear missile strike by a state with an arsenal of nuclear weapons” [4, 6]. Within the framework of this PGS scenario, US experts consider the following military-political situation and its development, the analysis of which is given below based on the materials of publications [4, 5, 7].

1.1. An adversary is a regional state possessing an arsenal of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, pursuing a policy unacceptable for the United States and its allies, putting forward unrealizable demands and threatening to use nuclear weapons (NW) if they are not met. At the same time, not only regional countries that are American allies, but also the continental part of the United States are under the threat of a nuclear strike. The enemy possesses mobile and stationary complexes, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), as well as highly protected underground storage facilities for nuclear weapons. The leadership of the enemy country has already made a statement that it will be forced to issue an order to launch a nuclear strike in the event of a threat of an attack by the United States and its allies. An adversary’s ICBMs can be launched no earlier than 10-15 minutes after the opposing country uncovers the fact that the United States is preparing and delivering a pre-emptive strike.

1.2. USA: it is assumed that in the event of a massive ICBM strike by the enemy, the national missile defence (ABM) system will be able to intercept a small percentage of the total number of ICBMs involved in the strike. The top military-political leadership of the United States needs to reliably determine the degree of determination of the enemy country to unleash a nuclear conflict and to take action on preventive intervention of the US Armed Forces in the form of a PGS at the ICBM bases, carriers of nuclear weapons and their storage sites, in order to prevent a nuclear missile attack on the United States. When deciding on PGS, it is necessary to be guided by the principle according to which the United States cannot allow any state to use the policy of nuclear blackmail both against itself and against its allies.

1.3. US actions in the military field and assessment of military-political risks:

– taking into account the limited capabilities of the US missile defence system, it is necessary to ensure the surprise of the application of the PGS and perform the task of preventing an enemy nuclear weapons strike within 10 minutes after the corresponding decision of the highest military-political US leadership;

-the use of nuclear weapons by the United States can be regarded by the world community as exceeding the force permissible in the current situation;

-an attack of nuclear weapons on the enemy’s territory will have catastrophic consequences for the entire region and will entail mass death of the civilian population, as well as radioactive contamination of territories, including in neighboring countries that are possibly allies of the United States;

– despite the high likelihood of the emerging conflict escalating into a full-scale war, the United States intends to use all available capabilities of its Armed Forces in order to eliminate the threat of a nuclear strike from the enemy;

– as the most expedient way to neutralize the threat under consideration and exclude geopolitical risks from the use of nuclear weapons, the sudden preventive massive use of high precision weapons (HPW) in conventional equipment is considered: ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with the simultaneous transferring of regional and national missile defence systems to an active mode.

1.4. Risk assessment in the military-technical sphere:

– ICBMs, SLBMs in conventional equipment have the highest degree of readiness for use and a relatively short flight time; however, they have a lower efficiency of destruction of targets located in highly protected underground shelters than ALCMs and SLCMs;

– ALCMs and SLCMs in conventional equipment have the best characteristics for hitting highly protected targets, but they can be destroyed by enemy air defence and missile defence systems and have a long flight time.

1.5. For this scenario of PGS implementation, the following features are characteristic [4–7]:

– a decisive role in achieving PGS goals is played by the factor of surprise in the use of HPW striking means;

-to reduce the flight time of ALCMs and SLCMs when applying HPW, it is allowed to use the territory and airspace of friendly and unfriendly states for the United States, including without their knowledge, and also taking into account the factor of countering ALCMs and SLCMs by their air defence and missile defence forces;

– to ensure the stated time requirements for the preparation and application of the HPW, the minimum time is required for assessing the situation, making a decision and preparing the HPW strike systems for combat use;

– in order to reduce the time required for assessing the situation, it is necessary to deploy and interface with the HPW systems of the global space reconnaissance and target designation system, which in advance, in peacetime, by means of space reconnaissance equipment, reveals the location of key targets and issues target designation to the HPW equipment at the stage of applying the PGS.

The last point shows the importance of interfacing the HPW system with elements of the global space reconnaissance and target designation system in the implementation of this version of the PGS. The importance of space systems is emphasized by the fact that within the framework of the PGS concept, it is the attack on them that is the second variant of the retaliatory application of the PGS, while the other versions of the PGS correspond to the solution of private military-political tasks of countering terrorism.

2. “Bilateral confrontation caused by the actions of a state comparable to the United States in military potential, aimed at disrupting the combat support of the Air Force and its allies by deliberately disrupting the functioning of American space communications and intelligence systems.”

This option provides for the aggravation of the military-political situation in the event of the deliberate destruction of one of the US military spacecraft by the enemy, which has the capabilities to conduct hostilities in space. At the same time, the United States intends not only to suppress aggression, but also to avoid further escalation of the conflict into a full-scale armed confrontation. Within this scenario of the PGS, US experts consider the following military-political situation and its development, the analysis of which is given below based on the materials of [5, 7].

2.1. An adversary is a state comparable in military potential to the United States, having nuclear weapons and modern means of delivering them, carrying out comprehensive modernization and equipping its Armed Forces with new types of weapons. The enemy’s deeply echeloned air defence system, as well as modern means of radio-electronic reconnaissance (RER) and command and control of troops, significantly complicates the task of covert penetration into its airspace. The enemy is actively working to improve the anti-space defence (ASD) systems already in service. The enemy is currently at war with one of the neighboring states. At the considered stage of the development of the situation, the military conflict is limited, but there is a real threat of its escalation to the scale of a regional armed conflict. At the same time, the United States, having long-term bilateral obligations to provide assistance in the field of defence to a state with which the enemy is at war, has already sent official protests to the latter and issued warnings. In response, the enemy used ASD weapons and disabled one of the US spacecraft. This act of aggression led to the immediate emergence of a regional crisis, as well as to the creation of serious crisis situations in other regions of the world. The enemy’s Armed Forces are conducting general mobilization measures. There were no apologies or explanations for their actions from the enemy’s leadership.

2.2. USA: The Armed Forces of the country are on the “constant” level of combat readiness. The United States has military assistance agreements with several states in the conflict region, including one with which the enemy is at war. The US Armed Forces, using space-based reconnaissance systems, constantly monitor the elements of the enemy’s space-based reconnaissance systems, the deployment of which is determined with high accuracy. The United States has taken the initiative to consider the fact of aggression in the UN and other regional international organizations in order to take measures aimed at containing the aggressive actions of the enemy. All UN members, including the United States, consider it necessary to prevent the escalation of this limited conflict and its escalation into a large-scale war. After the meeting of the National Security Council, the US President ordered the destruction of the enemy’s anti-satellite warfare (ASW) system in order to prevent repeated attacks on spacecraft that are part of the US Orbital Group (OG).

2.3. Factors taken into account and actions taken in the military-political sphere:

– despite the existence of an order for an immediate response in order to prevent such attacks from the enemy, the leadership of the US Armed Forces is forced to introduce a number of restrictions aimed at localizing the conflict, such as the use of only the minimum necessary forces and means to accomplish the specified task;

– there is no necessary time to attract additional resources and organize additional training of the forces and means involved;

– successful implementation of the task cannot be achieved without a real and reliable assessment of the results of the use of the means of destruction involved;

– the first strike against the enemy’s targets must have a high probability of success, since in the event of a need for repeated use of strike weapons, the likelihood of retaliatory actions will significantly increase and, as a consequence, the risk of losses on the part of the United States and its allies;

-possible retaliatory actions from the side of the enemy must be carefully analyzed for timely countermeasures;

-there is a significant risk of escalation of the conflict and its escalation into a large-scale war.

2.4. Factors taken into account and actions taken in the military-technical field:

– it is necessary to temporarily change the orbits of the spacecraft that are part of the US OG in order to create obstacles for a repeated attack from the enemy’s anti-satellite warfare (ASW), as well as to obtain additional time for preparation for a retaliatory operation;

– it is necessary to determine in advance the order of actions of the US Armed Forces in the breaking of the functioning of the combat control system of the enemy’s ASW strike assets;

– it is necessary to clarify and confirm the available information about the enemy’s ASW system, as well as about the strike means of the ASW to be destroyed;

-it is necessary to develop a procedure for using technical means to recognize the actual and false targets as part of the adversary’s ASW system;

– it is necessary to determine the feasibility of using kinetic weapons to solve the tasks of destroying the spacecraft of the enemy’s ASW system;

– it is necessary to determine the procedure for using in the current situation various technical means of assessing the effectiveness of the use of strike weapons;

– alternative possibilities of checking the results of the use of strike forces and weapons against the enemy’s ASW system.

2.5 Basic principles of action taken. The US military must be ready to use all available opportunities to protect its military personnel and military facilities, despite the order of the President of the United States to use the minimum necessary number of forces and means to destroy the enemy’s ASW systems, and the need to comply with all existing international treaties, including those concerning the sovereignty of the airspace of other countries, as well as for the adoption of measures aimed at preventing the death of civilians and the elimination of collateral damage.

2.6. Temporary parameters of conducting the operation:

-the decision by the military-political leadership of the United States to carry out the operation

– a day after the enemy attacked the US spacecraft;

-transfer of the forces and means planned for use in the operation into a “full” combat readiness – within 24 hours after the decision to carry out the operation;

-the duration of the operation -12 hours, after the completion of the measures for the transfer to combat readiness “full”;

– assessment of the effectiveness of the use of strike weapons against targets on enemy territory — within 12 hours after the strike;

-carrying out the operation – no more than 2 days after the attack on the US spacecraft.

2.7. The form of the operation is the sudden massive use of high precision weapons (HPW) in conventional equipment: ICBMs, SLBMs, ALCMs and SLCMs on elements of the enemy’s land and sea-based system of anti-satellite warfare (ASW); striking with kinetic weapons at the enemy’s spacecraft and elements of the space-based ASW system.

Thus, the analysis of the above two scenarios shows that the concept of the PGS of the US Armed Forces creates the prerequisites for a massive “disarming strike” on the main elements of both the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation (RF) and on elements of the anti-space defence (ASD) as part of the Aerospace Defence System (ADS) of the RF, which actualizes the conduct of research in the field of development of the ASD system when solving problems of reflection on the PGS.

In this case, when applying HPW, several fundamentally different types of aerospace attack weapons (AAW) can be involved, the speed, height and trajectory of which differ significantly, which must be taken into account when solving the problem of detecting and counteracting these means [4, 5, 8, 9]:

– SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles)- range of 500-3000 km; the flight profile provides for an altitude of up to 20 km, in the overwhelming majority, SLCMs fly at speeds of 300-560 km / h at low altitude, following the terrain, with location control by signals satellite radio navigation systems (SRNS) (Tomahawk, Fasthawk are considered as prototypes of SLCMs);

– ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles)- range of 300–1000 km; the flight profile provides for an altitude of up to 20 km, in the overwhelming majority, ALCMs fly at speeds of 300–1000 km / h at low altitude following the terrain, with position control according to signals from the SRNS (AGM-158 JASSM is considered as a prototype of ALCMs);

– Silo-based ICBMs – operating range 9000-13000 km; flight trajectory – ballistic; the apogee of the trajectory is 1000-1300 km; average flight speed –23100 km / h (LGM-30G Minuteman III is considered as a prototype silo-based ICBM);

– SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) – range 7800–11300 km; flight trajectory – ballistic; the apogee of the trajectory is 1000-1300 km; average flight speed – 23000 km / h (UGM-133A Trident II (D5) is considered as a prototype SLBM);

– MRBM (medium-range ballistic missiles) – range 1000–5500 km; flight trajectory – ballistic; the apogee of the trajectory is up to 1000 km; average flight speed – up to 9000 km / h (MGM-31C Pershing II is considered as a prototype of the MRBM);

-gliding warheads (GWs), hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) and hypersonic aircraft (HA) – flight range 300-3000 km; launch / flight altitude in the range from 20-25 km to 100-120 km; flight speed: 6-15M (2-5 km / s); operating range, taking into account the carrier’s flight range: for land-based / sea-based HA – 300–1000 km; for airborne HA – 2000–3000 km; for HA on ICBMs – 8000-12000 km; space-based – over the entire surface of the Earth (X-51A Waverider, HTV-2, AHW and DF-ZF are considered as prototypes of the HCM and HA).

The role of space systems for reconnaissance and target designation, communication, navigation in the information support of the use of high-precision weapons in the framework of the application of “Prompt Global Strike“.

The works [10–19] are devoted to the study of the retrospective development of forces and means of the anti-space defence (ASD) in the USSR and the USA. In these works it is shown that research on the subject of ASD developed within the framework of work on the creation of missile attack warning systems (EWS), anti-missile (ABM) and missile-space (MSD) defence systems. In the USSR, by the end of the 1980s, the early warning systems, space control means (SCM) and missile defence systems (ABM) were complicated technical complexes geographically located at large distances from each other and united into a single missile defence system, functioning according to unified control algorithms, operating in real time. At the same time, the EWS and SCM were entrusted with the tasks of conducting reconnaissance and control of outer space, and the missile defence system (ABM) system – with the atmospheric interception of ICBMs and CMs at altitudes of 5-24 km, and the transatmospheric interception of ICBMs at altitudes of 130-350 km; –1350 km by launching into orbit and targeting satellites-interceptors [10, 16–19]. In 1993, following the decision of the 38th session of the UN General Assembly to prohibit the use of force in outer space, the Russian Federation unilaterally removed from service the ASD complex, while at the same time, the early warning, missile defence and missile defence systems continue to function normally within the RF Aerospace Defence System (ADS).

Considering the features of various types of ICBMs with the composition of the high precision weapons (HPW), it can be noted that when organizing countermeasures to the HPW, various means and forces of the aerospace defence must solve various problems (Figure 1):

– strikes, issuance of target designation for missile defence strike weapons;

– missile defence equipment – intercept by interceptor missiles (PR) of ICBMs and MRBMs for targeting from early warning systems;

– object and military air defence, radar and RTR equipment on the ships of the Navy – control of the entry of ALCM carrier aircraft, ships and submarines of SLCM carriers into controlled airspace, opening the fact of an ALCM and SLCM strike, tracking them and issuing target designations for air defence equipment;

– means of object and military air defence, sea-based air defence systems – interception of ALCM and SLCM.

Figure 1 – Systems and tools involved in solving the problem of detecting and combating the ICS of the PGS [8]

With such a distribution of forces and means, it may seem that the means of the ASD do not play a significant role in repelling the PGS. However, it is not. It is the ASD funds that can play a decisive role in the preventive reflection of biogas plant, in fact, to prevent it, because of the technical impossibility of ensuring the “high precision” of the use of the above-mentioned aerospace attack weapons (AAW).

A feature of the use of strike weapons of the HPW PGS (ICBMs, SLBMs, SLCMs and ALCMs) is the close integration of the entire HPW system with the global space reconnaissance and target designation system, global navigation and communication systems (Figure 2).

Figure 2 – Space support for the use of HPW means

The space reconnaissance and target designation system, in advance, in peacetime, by means of an optical-electronic spacecraft (OER), RLR, radio and radio technical reconnaissance (RTRR), reveals the location of key objects of strategic nuclear forces and elements of the RF ASD and issues target designation to HPW strike weapons directly in the moment of applying HPW. At the same time, the navigation systems of all the above-mentioned HPW means significantly depend on the signals of the SRNS, which in fact ensures their “high accuracy”, and the possibility of re-targeting the missile defence system for striking mobile objects, monitoring the effectiveness of the defeat is ensured by forming and maintaining two-way communication between the control point (CP) of the PGS and CD through satellite communication systems (SSS) [4, 8].

Thus, the destabilizing effect on the spacecraft of the above space systems will significantly reduce the effectiveness of the HPW strike weapons.

Figure 1 – Systems and tools involved in solving the problem of detecting and combating the ICS of the PGS [8]

A feature of space systems is the heterogeneity and different heights of their OG in near-earth space [21, 22]:

a) low orbits (200–1500 km) – the area of ​​deployment, first of all, of space reconnaissance and target designation systems, as well as some low-orbit SSS:

– OER means (for example, OG SLF KH-11–290–235 km; OG SLF SEE ME – 200–350 km);

– radar equipment (for example, OG SLF Lacrosse – 600–700 km); – RTR equipment (for example, SLF SSU – 830–1200 km, SLF Ferret-D – 700–800 km);

– meteorological observation equipment ( for example, spacecraft NOAA – 800–900 km);

– SSS Iridium (spaceCMaft altitude –780 km) [23];

-SSS Globalstar (spacecraft altitude -194 km);

– planned for deployment of Starlink SLFS (spacecraft altitude – 335-1325 km);

– planned for deployment of OneWeb SLFS (estimated spacecraft altitude -1200 km);

– ССС O3b (spacecraft altitude -8060-8070 km );

b) medium orbits (19500-22000 km) – the area of ​​the SRNS deployment;

c) geostationary (GSO) and higher orbits (36000 km above) – the area of ​​deployment, first of all, the CCS, as well as some relay and data transmission systems, and See also RRTR and SPRN systems:

– SSS for military purposes (for example, OG SLF WGS, DSLFS, AEHF, MilStar, MUOS, UFO, etc. – GSO);

– SSS for civil and dual-use (for example, OG SLF Inmarsat, Thuraya – GSO); – space relay and transmission systems data from low-orbit reconnaissance satellites (for example, SDS-GSO spacecraft);

– space-based early warning systems (for example, IMEWS-GSO spacecraft);

– RRTR spacecraft (for example, Vortex Spacecraft – 36000–38000 km).

Figure 2 – Space support for the use of HPW means

The analysis of the above space systems shows that practically all of them are involved in one way or another in the use of HPW means that inflict HPW and countering them is the most important task of the ASD aimed at reducing: timeliness, accuracy and completeness of target designation; efficiency, stability and continuity of control of the ICS by the PU PGS; accuracy of combat use of SVKN at the stages of direct hitting of targets and retargeting.

The role and place of the anti-space defence system in solving the problem of countering the “Prompt Global Strike”. Prospects for the development of the forces of the ASD and the means of the ASD are considered in [8, 19, 21, 24–32]. Generalization of these works allows us to draw the following generalized conclusions.

1. Traditionally, historically, as the means of ASD, PRs were considered, solving the problems of kinetic destruction of spacecraft in low orbits. However, this ASD weapon has a number of drawbacks that prevent it from being considered a “universal” ASD tool. First, the tests of such weapons have shown that with such a defeat of the spacecraft, an unacceptably large amount of “space debris” is formed, and with the massive use of PR to destroy the spacecraft, space may simply be inaccessible due to the Kessler effect. Second, the existing land-based and sea-based ASD models are capable of striking spacecraft exclusively in low orbits. Spacecraft in medium orbits and GSO are, in principle, inaccessible to them.

2. Restrictions in the use of PR for solving the problems of the ASD led to active exploratory research and development of fundamentally new land / sea-based means, focused on the so-called “functional defeat” of the spacecraft: means of electronic suppression (EW); means of functional destruction by electromagnetic radiation (FPEMI), first of all, ultra-high-frequency (microwave) and laser radiation, accelerator (beam) weapons.

3. Regardless of its type, land / sea-based SSP by their nature have a number of objective limitations associated with the high distance from them of targets. The desire of the leading foreign countries (LFC) to ensure dominance in the space sphere leads to the militarization of outer space and the development of samples of MSE operating from outer space and through space: aerospace aircraft; survey satellites; interceptor satellites; orbital platforms for long-term storage of percussion space vehicles; GZLA and GZKR space-based; SLF – carriers of REB, FPEMI (laser and microwave), accelerator (beam) weapons; kinetic weapons (railguns). The peak of projects for the creation of space weapons and military equipment fell on the program “Strategic Defence Initiative”, implemented in the United States in the late 1980s. Now, after a break, prospecting work in this area is resumed, due to the strategic advantages of space-based weapons, the main of which are the global reach on the scale of the Earth, surprise application, efficiency of hitting targets, inevitability and complexity of counteraction.

4. The analysis of works [33–39] in the field of the international legal framework for the use of outer space for military purposes showed the following. The International Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits the placement in outer space of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological. Other types of weapons are not covered in this treaty. The exit in 2002 by the USA from the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems from 1972 meant that their obligations not to create, test or deploy space-based missile defence systems and strike components ceased to exist. This paved the way for the creation of space-based weapons and military equipment, including strike systems of ASD operating in space, as well as strike systems operating from space – space-based HPW of the “space-to-Earth” type. So in 2019, in the United States were formed a new type of Armed Forces – space forces, and the US regulatory framework as of 2019 envisages the formation of a “comprehensive strategy for military operations in outer space”, the development and testing of space-based strike systems until 2022, and by 2030. – putting them into regular operation. Other LFC, such as China and France, also pursue a policy of militarizing space.

5. Thus, the LFC, and above all the United States, are actively developing the means of SSB and ASD, form doctrines and concepts aimed at capturing initiative and dominating in near-earth space, as well as developing strike systems operating in space, from space and through space … The delay in the development of the means of security and defence systems will lead to the loss of the geopolitical positions of the Russian Federation, as well as to its vulnerability in relation to a wide range of threats in space and through space.

With regard to the tasks of ASD in preventing and repelling a biogas plant, as well as reducing the effectiveness of a biogas plant, it is proposed to implement the following steps of counteraction:

1. In peacetime, intelligence information is continuously collected in order to identify signs of preparation for a biogas plant. To carry out these measures, the following are involved:

– the means of the SLFM, which conduct continuous monitoring of the OG of the spacecraft and the enemy’s HPW space complexes, providing preparation for the HPW;

– ground-based electronic warfare (EW) systems for space purposes, which conduct continuous monitoring of the OG of the spacecraft RLR, communications, relay and combat control;

2. Threatened period upon receipt of reliable reconnaissance information, the planned application of HPW on the main elements of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation or elements of the anti-missile defence within the RF Aerospace Defence Forces, the impact is carried out in order to reduce the effectiveness of preparation for the use of enemy missile defence systems, ICBMs, and SLBMs. To carry out these measures, the following are involved: – the means of the SLFM, which carry out continuous monitoring of the radio-electronic situation, as well as the calculation of target designations for spacecraft and space complexes as part of the enemy’s OG for the means of anti-missile defence;

-laser complexes FP EMI of the enemy’s space assets, which use “harassing” mode against the OER spacecraft and the early warning system;

– ground-based REW systems for space purposes, which continuously monitor the radio-electronic situation and use “low-energy” and “intelligent” suppression modes against RLR spacecraft, communications spacecraft, relay and combat control as part of the enemy’s OG;

– space complexes REP, which carry out continuous monitoring of the electronic situation and use a “low-energy, intelligent” mode of operation against earth and gateway stations of the CCS and relaying, as well as radar stations, command and measurement systems, navigation receivers and other radio-electronic means of the enemy;

– ground-based ASD complexes of kinetic and functional counteraction, which prepare for use on the OG SLF and space complexes of the enemy;

– space complexes of kinetic and functional counteraction, which prepare for use on the OG SLF and space complexes of the enemy.

3. During war time, when revealing the fact that a PGS has been inflicted on the territory of the Russian Federation, full-scale opposition is carried out with all available forces and means in order to reduce the effectiveness of the use of enemy missile launchers, ICBMs, and SLBMs. To carry out these activities, the following will be involved:

-means of the SLFM, which carry out continuous monitoring of the radio-electronic situation, the calculation of target designations for the means of destruction of anti-missile defence systems, as well as control of the defeat of the OG of the spacecraft and space complexes of the enemy;

– ground-based REP systems for space purposes, which suppress RLR spacecraft, SLFS spacecraft, relay and combat control spacecraft;

– space complexes REP, which carry out the suppression of ZS, AL systems and relaying, as well as radar stations, command and measurement systems, navigation receivers and other radio electronic means of the enemy;

– ground-based ASD complexes of kinetic and functional counteraction, which destroy the OG of spacecraft and space low-orbit complexes of the enemy; – space complexes of ASD of kinetic and functional counteraction, which defeat the ES of spacecraft and space complexes of the enemy in medium circular, geostationary and highly elliptical orbits.

Conclusions. The analysis showed that when solving the problems of increasing the efficiency of the RF defence system in the interests of countering the PGS by the US Armed Forces, it is relevant to formulate and solve the following military-technical scientific tasks:

1. It is necessary to develop a scientific and methodological apparatus (SMA) to substantiate the tasks, role and place of the ASD as part of the tasks of the aerospace defence, the interconnected combat use of the ASD forces, with other aerospace defence forces (missile defence, air defence, RTV, etc.) when solving the problem of preventing and repelling the PGS PO the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. It is necessary to develop intangible assets for the formation of a schedule of combat duty, stationary bases, patrol routes for ground, sea, air and space forces of the aerospace in the interests of ensuring the timely and reliable opening of the fact of the attack by the SVKN on the Russian Federation.

3. It is necessary to develop intangible assets to substantiate the rational structure of the multi-echeloned system of the SLFKPS, taking into account the use of diverse ground, sea, air and space-based means, the capabilities of individual means for the timeliness of opening the HPW, for the detection range of the UHCS, the altitude and speed of flight of detected objects, the ability to recognize and accompany specific types of enemy spacecraft, as well as the capabilities of target designation of means of destruction – complexes of ASD, REP and FP EMI for space purposes.

4. It is necessary to develop intangible assets to substantiate the rational structure and procedure for the military use of kinetic, electronic functional destruction / suppression weapons in service with the ASD forces, taking into account their combat effectiveness against specific types of enemy spacecraft that provide information support for the application of PGS, as well as taking into account the timeliness, stability and the completeness of the receipt of information about these spacecraft from the SLFKP facilities.

5. In the interests of the formation of winning scenarios of military confrontation between the ISKN inflicting PGS and the ASD system as part of the ADS, it is necessary to develop an intangible asset modeling such a conflict, taking into account the capabilities of both sides to detect, target and defeat the means of the opposing side, as well as taking into account the capabilities of the parties to build and replenishment of their resources, diminishing in the course of the conflict.

Some of the results presented in the article were obtained within the framework of the state budgetary theme of R&D SPIIRAS No. 0073-2019-0004.

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